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Abstract
One of the most vexing public policy issues is the extent to which governments should intervene into
private contractual relationships. The purpose of this paper is to explore both theoretically and empirically
the extent to which such interventions may enhance eﬃciency. In the case of employment law, economists
have traditionally taken the view that intervention, such as protection against wrongful discharge, simply
undoes the original intent of the parties to the agreement. We find that both the good faith and the implied
contract exceptions to employment at will may enhance employment in occupations characterized by high
levels of investment. These results suggest that under the appropriate conditions courts may enhance the
operation of a competitive market by setting appropriate default remedies for breach of contract.
JEL Classification: J11, J21, J31, J61, K12, K31
1 Introduction
One of the most vexing public policy issues is the extent to which governments should intervene into
private contractual relationships. The purpose of this paper is to explore both theoretically and empirically
the extent to which such interventions may enhance eﬃciency. In the case of employment law, economists
have traditionally taken the view that intervention, such as protection against wrongful discharge, simply
undoes the original intent of the parties to the agreement. Therefore, such interventions cannot enhance
welfare and are more likely to reduce social welfare.
In practice, the contracts that govern complex relations such as employment are incomplete.
Therefore, when an unanticipated event occurs, parties may ask the courts to provide the missing terms. In
the United States, the traditional common law rule is employment at-will: each party is free to leave at any
point without being required to provide a reason and without facing any liability. Under this rule, disputes
requiring intervention should be rare because diﬀerences in opinion simply result in a dissolution of the
relationship.
This does not imply that the at-will rule is always an eﬃcient contract.1 As Williamson, Wachter,
and Harris (1975) illustrate, employers and employees make significant relationship specific investments
that may require some contractual protection. In a competitive market, one expects parties to discover and
to use such eﬃcient contracts, and hence there is a general presumption that, whenever the parties do not
specify an exception to at-will employment, the at-will rule is the presumptive choice of the parties.
In the context of the eﬃcient labor employment debate, there is also a general presumption among
economists that at-will employment allows firms to eﬃciently adjust their labor force in response to
demand shock and to shed the least productive workers. In a sense, at-will employment protects firms from
poor workers (see in particular the 1994 OECD jobs study that calls for a general reduction in employment
protection). If employment at-will is regarded as an optimal strategy, then how do we explain the general
erosion of the common law rule of employment at-will that has been observed in the United States?2
Even a cursory reading of some employment cases reveals a rich tapestry of poor, incompetent and
in some cases dishonest behavior by employers.3 In response, the courts have provided employees in these
cases some relief from the behavior of their employers. For example, the good faith exception to
employment at-will evolved in response to employers who attempted to dismiss an employee in order to
avoid paying a commission upon a sale negotiated by the employee.4 In these cases, the courts can be seen
as improving the quality of the contract between the employer and employee.
Hence, from the micro perspective of a specific case coming before the courts, it would appear that
the courts are not making unreasonable demands upon employers, they are simply requiring employers to
behave in a fair and just manner. These rulings, as much of the literature emphasizes, place additional
burdens upon employers who already manage their employees well.
This leads to two questions. First, does requiring poor employers to be more diligent in monitoring
their workers increase eﬃciency? Second, if this is the case, can the introduction of wrongful discharge laws
enhance eﬃciency on average - since it applies to both good and bad employers?
In this paper, we make some progress on both questions. First, using the model of MacLeod
(2003), we show that in theory requiring employers to provide a reason for dismissing employees can
1See MacLeod (2005) for a review of the literature and for a discussion of the conditions under which the at-will rule is not
eﬃcient.
2 See Epstein (1984) critique of the erosion of at-will employment in the U.S.
3 See Rothstein and Liebman (2003) for a review of the law; in particular chapter 10 discusses a number of discharge cases.
4 See Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, 769 F.2d 109 (2d Cir.) 1985.
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increase both the wages of employees and their productivity. The idea is straightforward. All jobs require
some element of subjective evaluation of employees, and hence there is always a chance that the evaluation
of the employer is erroneous. This can lead to lower wages and productivity by workers, but it can be
corrected when employers are required to put into place systems of employee evaluation that produce
verifiable information that is usable in court.
From previous research (discussed in more detail in the next section), there is substantial evidence
that on average wrongful discharge laws may be detrimental to employment. As Heckman and Pagés
(2004) observe in their introduction, this eﬀect is largest in jobs with high turnover and fewer relationship
specific investments because for these jobs the rules provide greater constraints on the eﬃcient adjustment
of labor. In jobs with lower turnover and higher human capital investments, such laws are more likely to
constrain poor managers who do not properly monitor and document worker performance.
Accordingly, in our empirical work, we divide jobs according to diﬀerent measures of human
capital investment, and we find that the negative eﬀect on employment is strongest in jobs with lower
levels of investment - a result consistent with earlier findings. We also find - particularly in the case of the
good faith exception to employment at-will - some evidence that wrongful discharge laws can have positive
eﬀects upon employment, with no corresponding decrease in wages. Hence, we may conclude that legal
default rules introduced in response to observed wrongs may in some cases increase workers’ welfare.
The agenda of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we discuss the specific exceptions to the
common law rule of employment at-will that have been introduced in the United States in the past 20
years, and we review the prior literature that assesses empirically the impact of this legislation. Section 3
outlines a model that illustrates one mechanism by which employment law may enhance eﬃciency. This is
followed by a description of the data, empirical methodology and empirical results. The paper concludes
with a discussion of the results and directions for future research.
2 The Economics of Employment Law: Previous Literature
The previous economics literature on employment law addresses two issues. The first is whether the law
has an impact at all. The second is whether a specific law has a negative or positive impact upon
particular groups.
Edward Lazear (1990) observes that in a Coasian world the law acts as a constraint on the
observed contract; however, parties can find ways to contract around the explicit rules. Even if this is
diﬃcult, firms would oﬀer lower starting wages to pay for the cost of dismissing a worker later, and hence
total employment would not be aﬀected. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) provide one of the seminal models of
employment protection law. They show that the theoretical impact of the law upon short run employment
is ambiguous; however, if contracts are complete, then as Lazear (1990)’s argues, there would be no long
run eﬀect.5
Schwab (1993) provides an economic analysis of employment law, and he argues much of the case
law is developed late in an employee’s life-cycle. At that point there is a significant level of relationship
specific capital, and hence they need more protection from opportunistic employers. In general, Schwab
argues that employment law rationally provides rulings intended to enhance the employment relationship.
In contrast, the 1994 OECD jobs study called for a general reduction in employment protection rules, in
order to enhance flexibility in the labor market. Much of the subsequent empirical literature has focused
upon measuring the costs arising from employment protection laws.
5See Bertola (2004) for an extention of this work to risk averse workers. In that case EPL (Employment Protection Legisla-
tion) plays a role in reallocating the cost of turnover from workers to firms, which in some cases increases eﬃciency. See also
the recent work of Blanchard and Tirole (2004) where worker risk aversion plays a crucial role.
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Consistent with Lazear (1990), Oyer and Schaefer (2000) show that employers can find ways to
circumvent the Civil Rights Acts that protect workers based upon race or gender. They do this by moving
from individual dismissal to mass layoﬀs during downturns. However, Chay (1998) does find some evidence
that this act did improve the economic welfare of African Americans. Recent work by DeLeire (2000),
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), and Jolls and Prescott (2004) shows that the Americans with Disabilities
Act harmed these individuals.
Apart from the Federal Acts, each state has adopted three classes of exceptions to employment
at-will (Wrongful Discharge Laws or WDLs in short) during the 1970s and 1980s. These exceptions declare
situations where the default employment relationship is not at-will. Each of them will be discussed in
detail below.
2.1 Exceptions to Employment At-Will
Implied Contract Exception When a worker can verify that a permanent employment relationship is
promised by his employer, then such employment can no longer be regarded as at-will and can be
terminated only under just cause.6 If a personnel manual given to employees specifies that termination is
only with cause, then several court decisions view this as a binding contract. As Judge C. J. Wilentz states
in the case of Woolley v. Hoﬀmann-La Roch: “it would be unfair to allow an employer to distribute a
policy manual that makes the workforce believe that certain promises have been made and then to allow
the employer to renege on these promises.”
Such a rule simply requires the employer not to mislead the employee, and hence in principal it
should be eﬃciency enhancing. Notice that if this were the only grounds for litigation, then evidence of a
negative eﬀect of the doctrine would imply that employers either knowingly deceived employees or erred in
writing their employee handbooks. However, employee handbooks are not the only example of an implied
contract. The case of Pugh v. See’s Candies established the principle that a long employment with regular
promotion establishes a long term contract.7 Thus, the employer can only dismiss an employee with cause
in these cases. Interestingly, the reason for Pugh’s dismissal appeared to be capricious - Pugh simply
disagreed with the firm’s agreement with its union regarding employment policy and reported to his
company that his current supervisor was a convicted embezzler. The supervisor subsequently fired Pugh.
It was ruled at court that this fact was not suﬃcient for a case but that the length of good service was
suﬃcient to establish an implied contract, and hence the court ruled that Pugh was wrongly dismissed.
This example illustrates a concrete case in which an employee is dismissed not because of an
objective failing (otherwise one could provide cause) but because essentially he did not fit in with the new
supervisor. If the contract were at-will, then dismissal would be immediate. Therefore, what this rule does
is place a bar on dismissing long term employees who may not fit in, or if delinquent in their performance,
the employers are unable to provide suﬃcient evidence of this poor performance.
Together, these rules impose a cost upon firms when they wish to dismiss an employee without
cause. It is diﬃcult to say what is the likely consequence of this law. Theoretically, if all agents are
rational, then there should be no eﬀect. However, if the rule reduces the eﬀect of deception by employers,
then we might get a positive eﬀect. When relationship specific investments are larger, there is less
turnover, and hence the negative eﬀect of restricting dismissal is likely to be smaller. In this case, we
expect the eﬀect of the law to be less negative and possibly positive.8
The time pattern of the adoption of the implied contract exception to at-will-employment is
6Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 292 N,W.2nd. 880 (Michigan 1980) and Woolley v. Hoﬀmann-La Roch, Inc., 499
A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985).
7Pugh v. See’s Candies, 171 Cal. Rptr 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
8 See Farber (1999) for a review of the literature on wage profiles and the returns to specific investments.
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illustrated in Figure 1. See also Figure 2 detailing the geographical extent of the changes. We have also
plotted the evolution of the other two exceptions namely the good faith and the public policy exceptions
which will be discussed below. It is not completely clear what motivated these changes. Krueger (1991)
presents evidence that these law changes were in response to the uncertainty of the courts in applying the
common law exceptions to employment at-will. If this is true, then these law changes did not actually
change the law per se, but they reduced the uncertainty associated with its application. If this is the case,
then the changes should lower legal costs, and hence if anything, the eﬀects should be positive. This is at
odds with the negative consequence of the law changes documented by Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006).
Good Faith Exception The implied contract rule requires the firm to provide cause when dismissing
employees who are deemed to be on a long term contract. The good faith exception to employment at-will
requires in addition that employees dismiss workers in a fair manner - they may not be required to provide
a reason, but they cannot dismiss workers in a patently unjust manner. Under this exception, workers do
not need to have the implicit promise of long term employment in order not to be dismissed unfairly. The
rule is illustrated in the case of Mitford v. Lasala.9 In this case, Mitford was an accountant fired from
employment in which there was a profit sharing agreement. It was ruled that termination arose to ensure
that Mitford would not share in profits to be realized. The courts ruled that “good faith and fair dealing...
would prohibit firing [an employee] for the purpose of preventing him from sharing in future profits.”
Currently, courts typically find a rather narrow application of this rule to the timing of dismissal
and payment of compensation, rather than to other forms of bad behavior by employers. Typical examples
of wrongful terminations that fit under this class are: i) a salesman being fired right before his commissions
should be paid to him, or ii) an employee being dismissed in order to avoid paying retirement benefits.
As we can see from Figure 1 and 2, there are many fewer states adopting this law than in the case
of the implied contract rule. Given the more narrow applicability of the rule, this may simply reflect the
fact that courts in these states have adhered more closely to the common law principle of at-will
employment, and hence there was a need for statutory intervention to deal with cases where employers
avoid paying compensation by a presumptive dismissal. If so, then we might expect this rule to have a
large impact.
This is not because of the eﬀect upon firing costs, but because it corrects poorly drafted contracts.
In the case of Mitford v. Lasala, the contract was quite clear, and it implied that the firm had no
obligation to pay the bonus. Most employees would expect to be paid in such a case, but at the time of
writing the agreement they simply would not expect the deception to occur. In such cases, the courts can
enhance productive eﬃciency by essentially completing an incomplete contract.10
Public Policy Exception We also present results on the impact of the public policy exception to
employment at-will. Under this exception, a termination is wrongful if it is a response to an employee’s
conduct that is not favored by the employer but is protected by law. The public policy exception covers the
cases where an employee should not be dismissed if he refuses to violate a state’s well-established public
policy. Miles (2000) summarizes the four circumstances of terminations that fit under this class of
exception.11 These are (1) "an employee’s refusal to commit an illegal act, such as perjury or price-fixing";
(2) "an employee’s missing work to perform a legal duty, such as jury duty or military service"; (3) "an
employee’s exercise of a legal right, such as filing a workman’s compensation claim"; and (4) "an
employee’s ’blowing the whistle,’ or disclosing wrongdoing by the employer or fellow employees."
9Mitford v. Lasala, 666 P.sd 1000 (Alaska 1963).
10 See Kornhauser and MacLeod (2005) for a further discussion of these issues.
11Page 78.
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An example of this exception is the 1985 case of Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.12 Tameny, the
dismissed employee, challenged the company’s decision in court claiming that the discharge was due to the
fact that he refused to perform the price-fixing scheme (which was unlawful) in favor of the company.
Atlantic Richfield argued that since there was no employment contract, Tameny’s employment was at-will
and could be terminated at any time. California Supreme Court ruled in favor of Tameny, stating that an
employer should not discharge an employee who obeyed the law and refused to perform an illegal act.
This exception does not, by itself, address the eﬃciency per se of the employment relationship, but
rather it merely constrains the behavior of the firm according to other existing laws. In other words, the
public policy exception helps to oversee that firms behave according to existing state’s and federal laws.
Therefore, we would not expect to see the public policy exception to have any eﬀect upon employment and
wages.
2.2 Employment Consequences of Exceptions to Employment At-Will
With increasing cost of discharge, firms will have the incentive to screen workers more carefully. Kugler
and Saint-Paul (2004) find that the laws make it harder for unemployed workers to get a new job relative
to currently employed workers because employers tend to think that the currently employed workers are
less likely to be “lemons”. One way for employers to avoid this cost of discharge is through the use of
temporary help agencies that allow employers to refrain from the liability associated with long term
employment. Autor (2003) shows that temporary help service employment has largely increased in
association with the adoption of the implied contract exception. Schanzenbach (2003) finds that in
association with the laws, full-time workers tend to have longer tenure. He, however, finds limited evidence
of the laws’ help increasing the return to tenure.
The empirical evidence on the eﬀect of this rule on overall employment is mixed. An early work by
Dertouzos and Karoly (1992) finds large negative eﬀects of the exceptions to employment at-will. More
recent work by Miles (2000) and Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) finds much smaller eﬀects. In fact,
Miles (2000) finds no significant eﬀects; although Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) do get consistently
negative eﬀects, particularly for workers with marginal attachment to the workforce. They find that the
negative eﬀect of the law on employment is significantly smaller than estimated by Dertouzos and Karoly
(1992) - about 0.6% to 0.8% on state’s employment per population compared to Dertouzos and Karoly’s
estimate of 3%. Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2004) explain that the diﬀerences between their results and
those of Dertouzos and Karoly (1992) are due to the problematic instruments used by Dertouzos and
Karoly (1992). They also argue that their results diﬀer from those of Miles (2000) because they use a
diﬀerent classification of case laws in identifying the adoption dates. They argue that, with their
classification, they "attempt to locate the first case in a state that might trigger a client letter from
attorneys warning about a change in law" and therefore "maximize the chance of detecting economic
eﬀects of changes to the common law." 13 In this paper, we use the adoption dates classification developed
by Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) who kindly provided us with the data. This information is shown
in Table 1.
In a recent study, Autor, Kerr, and Kugler (2005) use a data set that links workers to firms to
assess the productivity implication of WDLs. They find that overall these law changes reduced labor flows
and increased labor productivity, but they had little eﬀect on total factor productivity. These results are
consistent with the results we obtain in this paper.
The consequences of labor protection have also been extensively studied for developing countries,
developed countries, and worldwide. The type of regulation and the intensity of the protection vary
12Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3rd 167 (California 1980).
13Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2004) page 7.
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everywhere, even among the group of developed countries. The U.S.’s zero employment protection and the
Europeans’ excessive labor regulation are often compared. In most empirical studies, it seems like labor
protection does more harm than good, even though some theories have predicted otherwise. In an
empirical cross-country study, Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) show that
employment protection has a negative eﬀect on labor market outcome in terms of lower labor force
participation and higher unemployment.
Finally, the book edited by Heckman and Pagés (2004) provides a comprehensive study of the
impact of WDLs in Latin America. They find that on average, an increase in employment protection tends
to be economically costly. However, they do find that an increase in employment protection is advantageous
to incumbent workers, while lowering employment opportunities for new workers entering the labor market.
3 A Model of Wrongful Discharge Law
In this section, we introduce a simple model that illustrates the two channels through which wrongful
discharge law aﬀects employment and employee productivity. The model builds upon the results of
MacLeod (2003) who extends the standard principal agent model to the case of subjective evaluation. He
shows how the quality of the employment contract is aﬀected by the quality of an employer’s evaluation of
employee performance. Building upon the idea that there can be variation in the quality of an employer’s
system of evaluation, we model the introduction of wrongful discharge as an increase in both the cost of
firing a worker and in the quality of the evaluation of employee performance. The later occurs because
WDLs create an incentive for the employer to reduce legal liability by collecting more accurate and
verifiable information regarding employee performance. As MacLeod (2003) shows, if employer and
employee use this common and more accurate signal, it leads to higher wages and performance.
We explore how both the level of and variations in productivity interact with changes in WDLs. To
keeps matters as simple as possible, suppose we follow Jovanovic (1979) and suppose that all workers are
identical and have an alternative wage of w0 > 0. Variations in productivity arise from variations in match
quality and from firm specific demand shocks that may lead to dismissal for reasons unrelated to worker
behavior. In practice, workers vary in their ability; however, given that there is likely to be associative
matching of workers to firms, this extension does not significantly alter the insights of the simple model.
Consider a two period model in which the firm decides to hire a worker in the first period. We
extend this simple model in the next section to allow for training in the first period. This hiring decision is
based upon the firm’s initial estimate of match productivity, θ0, normalized to lie in [0, 1] . Production
occurs in period 2. The realized productivity of the match is θ, and it is assumed to be θ = θ0 with
probability π ∈ [0, 1] , and, with probability 1− π, given by a draw from the distribution g (·) with values
taken from [0, 1] . The total number of firms is N. An increase in π corresponds to a decrease in variability
of firm productivity and hence to a decrease in the probability that the firm will lay a worker oﬀ in period





The experiment we consider supposes that π is fixed, and for simplicity we assume that the initial
distribution of θ0 is the same as g (·) above. Thus, the ex ante and ex post distributions of productivity are
fixed. Given that there is an unlimited supply of workers at the reservation wage w0, the market
equilibrium will be characterized by two cutoﬀ productivities. In period 1 the cutoﬀ productivity level is
θA, so that firms with θ0 ≥ θA hire a worker. Ex post, the cutoﬀ productivity is θP , and hence workers
with realized productivity θ < θP are dismissed. Given that firing a worker is costly, it will be the case that
θP ≤ θA. We then explore the eﬀect that labor market regulation has on these cutoﬀ productivities. If θA
falls as a function of regulation, then the regulation enhances employment, while if it rises, then regulation
has a negative eﬀect on employment.
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As we discuss above, employment protection regulation has two eﬀects. First, it creates a firing
cost F that the firm must pay to a third party in the event of worker separation in period 2. As Lazear
(1990) has shown, if regulation merely mandates a transfer to workers in the event of separation, then the
employment contract can always undo the eﬀects of a separation cost. In that case, regulation would have
no eﬀect on employment, but it might reduce starting wages. In order for firing costs to aﬀect outcome,
they must be a pure social loss to the relationship via payments to the courts, to lawyers and to additional
administrative support staﬀ created by the regulation.
To avoid the complications that arise from computing an inter-temporal value function (as in
Jovanovic (1979)), we suppose that firms must make the decision to employ a worker in period 1, and then
they must pay the firing cost F if the worker is dismissed in period 2. As is standard in the matching
literature, dismissal occurs in period 2 if and only if current productivity is lower than the worker’s outside
option less the firing cost. Hence, an increase in legal costs leads to a lower θP in period 2.
The second eﬀect of employment protection regulation is an increase in the quality of worker
supervision. Employment protection regulation does not make firing a worker impossible; rather, it
requires the firm to provide a valid reason for the dismissal. If the firm has systematic records of employee
performance and can prove that the employee performed at an unacceptable level, then dismissal is
justified. However, if such records are lacking, then the firm may be required to pay damages for an unjust
dismissal. As a consequence, we should expect the lawyers in firms advising management to keep more
careful and systematic records of employee performance.
We formally illustrate this eﬀect using the model developed in section III of MacLeod (2003).
There, employee eﬀort, λ ∈ [0, 1] , is interpreted as the probability of eﬀort resulting in a good outcome. If
a bad outcome occurs, productivity is normalized to zero. When the good outcome occurs, one obtains the
realized productivity of the job θ; hence, the expected productivity of the worker’s eﬀort is λθ. The cost of
eﬀort of the work is V (λ) , where the cost function satisfies V (0) = 0, V 0 > 0, V 00 > 0 and
limλ→1 V (λ) =∞.
The firm cannot directly observe the eﬀort λ, but rather it observes a signal correlated to λ. If the
bad outcome occurs, it is assumed that both the worker and firm observe and agree upon this. If the good
outcome occurs, then both the worker and firm receive noisy signals that this has occurred, formally given
by T = {A,U} , where A denotes acceptable performance, and U denotes unacceptable performance. The
problem is that the worker and the firm may not agree that the performance is acceptable. For example,
the firm may believe that performance is acceptable and may reward the worker even though the worker
feels that his performance is unacceptable.
Formally, let γts be the probability that the signal pair ts is observed when the good outcome
occurs, where t is the firm’s observation, and s is the worker’s observation. For example, γUA is the
probability that, conditional upon the worker’s eﬀort being high, the firm believes eﬀort is unacceptable,
while the worker believes it is acceptable. This case can cause a problem, because the worker may believe
that he is being unfairly treated when the firm does not reward him for good performance. It is exactly
this type of situation that employment protection law tries to avoid. In the other cases, no problem arises -
if the firm believes performance is acceptable and thus rewards the employee, the employee will not object
regardless of his beliefs. Similarly, when both the employee and employer agree that performance is
unacceptable, there are no grounds for conflict.
In practice, diﬀerences of opinion are inevitable, and hence it is reasonable to suppose that
γUA > 0. MacLeod (2003) shows that as long as the evaluation for firm and realized performance are
correlated, then it is possible to write a contract that provides performance incentives. However, the cost
of providing incentives varies with the degree of correlation between the subjective evaluations of the firm
and the worker. The optimal contract in fact requires the worker to impose a cost upon the firm whenever
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the firm believes performance to be unacceptable, while the worker feels that it is acceptable.
If there were no transactions costs and if eﬀort were perfectly observable, then the wage of the
worker in a competitive labor market would be:
w = w0 + V (λ) .
The work would be paid her market wage, w0, plus a compensating diﬀerential, V (λ) , for the provision of
eﬀort λ. However, the firm cannot directly observe λ, but rather must use a subjective evaluation of
performance. MacLeod (2003) shows that the asymmetric information due to the subjective evaluation
introduces an additional deadweight cost:
C (λ, α) = λαV 0 (λ) , (1)
where α = γUAγAA is parameter that is called the perceived bias. The total cost to the firm of hiring a worker





= w + C (λ, α)
= w0 + V (λ) + C (λ, α) .
In other words, the cost of using a subjective evaluation system is a function of the likelihood that
the worker and firm disagree regarding acceptable performance. If they always agree, then there are no
agency costs. The evidentiary requirements of the legal system encourage an objective evaluation of
employee performance. The consequence is that a WDL is likely to lead to a decrease in α and hence to a
lowering of enforcement costs.
The benefit of expression 1 is that it allows us to write a reduced form model of employment that
nevertheless captures the consequence of subjective evaluation on employment costs. If the worker’s ex post














λθ − w0 − V (λ)− C (λ, α) , (3)




/∂α < 0. Observe that the solution to (2), λ (θ) , is an
increasing function of θ, and hence observed worker wages rise with productivity, even though the worker’s
utility remains unchanged. If a worker is dismissed, then the profit of the firm is simply −F. Thus, the firm
keeps the worker whenever θ ≥ θP , where the cutoﬀ productivity θP solves:
PE
³
θP , w0, α
´
= −F,
where we implicitly suppose that w0 is such that θP ∈ (0, 1) . The profit function of a firm with
productivity parameter θ0 is:
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Total employment in period 1 is given by:
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where G (·) is the cumulative distribution function corresponding to g (·) , and θA ¡w0, F, α, π¢ is
the unique solution to:
P
³
θA, w0, F, α, π
´⎧⎨
⎩
< 0, for θA = 1,
= 0 for θA ∈ [0, 1] ,
> 0 for θA = 0.
That is, for θ0 ≥ θA
¡
w0, F, α, π
¢
the firm earns non-negative profits from hiring the worker given the
optimal employment policy in period 2, (except when θA = 1, in which no employment is eﬃcient).
In the case of employment regulation, one typically assumes that w0 represents the income when
unemployed. Hence, it can be assumed to be exogenous and can be set such that there is an internal
solution, with total employment less than the supply of labor. We can now determine the eﬀect of a WDL.
Let L denote the strength of employment protection legislation, with α (L) and F (L) denoting the
corresponding eﬀects on perceived bias and on firing costs.








We can now compute the eﬀect that the law will have on employment via its eﬀect on θA
¡
w0, F, α, π
¢
- if
θA rises, then this corresponds to a decrease in employment and vice versa. For convenience, let
θ∗ (L) = θA
¡
w0, F (L) , α (L) , π
¢
; then when there is an interior solution then we have:
dP
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From this we can see that that eﬀect of a WDL upon employment is ambiguous. The increase in firing
costs leads to a fall in profits and to lower employment. Conversely, the law decreases the perceived bias in
employment relationships which increases performance.
The ambiguous eﬀect of the law upon employment is consistent with the previous literature that
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either finds no eﬀect or in some cases finds a negative eﬀect. In particular, as Heckman and Pagés (2004)
find, employment protection law has diﬀerential eﬀects upon diﬀerent categories of workers, with more
negative eﬀect upon younger workers and upon workers with more marginal attachments to the labor force.
This is consistent with the current model. Notice that the magnitude of ∂P∂F increases (is more negative)
with an increase in variability of employment (π falls). If the size of dα(L)dL is suﬃciently small, then for
high variability in worker productivity a WDL is predicted to have a negative eﬀect upon employment.
Conversely, consider the case in which π = 1, and hence there are no productivity shocks ex post.
In that case, firing costs have no eﬀect, and one has the unambiguous result:
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In this case, an increase in employment protection lowers the cost of eliciting eﬀort λ. Thus, the




, rise with employment protection. In summary, we find
that for jobs with low turnover, increased employment protection increases wages and employment, while
for jobs with high variability in productivity, one sees the opposite eﬀect. We now turn to our identification
strategy for testing these implications in our data.
3.1 Identification Strategy
In summary, when there is less variability in worker productivity, WDLs are likely to lead to higher
employment and wages, with the converse when variability is high. Hence, the theory predicts that the
eﬀect of WDLs are likely to be ambiguous as a function of job characteristics, particularly the degree to
which productivity fluctuates. However, we cannot directly measure worker productivity.
Rather, we have data on the amount of investment in worker training by occupation. This data
was collected before our period of interest, and hence the levels of investment reported are independent of
the changes in legal regime. We use this data to divide jobs into high, medium and low levels of
investment. Given that more training is associated with longer tenure and lower turnover, we would expect
that the eﬀect of the law is likely to be negative for occupations with low investment and possibly positive
for occupations that entail more investment.14
Formally, we can see this as follows. Suppose, as in Jovanovic (1979), the market is perfectly
competitive, and hence the worker internalizes all of the benefits and costs from investment. In other
words, it makes no diﬀerence whether the worker or the firm makes the training decision - the final
outcome is eﬃcient with the employment contract allocating the costs and benefits. An investment i in
worker training results in realized productivity θ0 + δ with probability π, and θ with probability (1− π) ,
where δ > 0. The idea is that this investment can be seen as task specific, and hence an increase in
variability in production reduces the benefits from investment. One can be more general than this, but it
would not alter our basic identification strategy. The benefit is that we can use our results above to easily
derive the optimal training strategy.
Investment in worker training occurs if and only if:
P
¡
θ0 + δ, w0, F, α, π
¢
− i ≥ P
¡





∂π∂θ0 > 0, it follows that, holding all else fixed, an increase in π (decrease in turnover) results in a
relaxation of this inequality. Hence, jobs with high investments are associated with low levels of worker
turnover. Thus, we predict that the eﬀect of WDLs are likely to have a more positive eﬀect on workers
14See Farber (1999) for a review of the eﬀects of worker training on job tenure.
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with higher levels of investment into skills, while it has a negative eﬀect on the employment of workers with
low levels of investment.
The eﬀect on wages is theoretically diﬃcult to determine because the starting wage depends upon
the structure of the employment contract. For example, the same amount of expected lifetime income can
be achieved with quite a bit of variation on how compensation is allocated between wages, severance pay
and retirement savings. We do not observe these variables in the data, and we do not know how they might
change in response to changes in the law.
4 Data
The main data source for our study is the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is the monthly
labor force survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The purpose of the survey is to
measure labor force participation and employment and to produce estimates of labor force characteristics
of the U.S. civilian non-institutional population aged 16 and older. About 60,000 households
(approximately 100,000 adults) are interviewed each month. The CPS has a 4-8-4 rotation group structure.
Households are interviewed consecutively for four months and are left out of the sample for eight months.
The households are again interviewed for another four consecutive months and are then left out of the
sample permanently. The earning questions are asked to only one-fourth of the workers in the survey each
month. These are the workers in their fourth and in their eighth months of the interviews (i.e., they are in
the outgoing rotation groups).
The CPS is composed of the Basic Monthly Surveys and the Supplements. The Basic Monthly
Surveys ask questions about labor force status and basic demographic information. In addition to the
Basic Monthly Surveys, occasionally, the CPS includes supplemental questions on subjects of interest to
federal and state agencies, to private foundations, and to other organizations. Questions in the CPS
supplements vary. Existing supplements include topics such as job training, job tenure, contingent
employment, worker displacement, veteran status, school enrollment, immigration, fertility, voting,
smoking, computer usage, health, and employee benefits. Questions in the Basic Monthly Surveys and in
the Job Training Supplements are of interest to us and will be utilized in this paper.
We use the CPS basic monthly files from 1983 to 1994 to construct the employment and the wage
data series for our regression analysis. There are two reasons why we start our data series in 1983 and not
earlier. First, the 2-digit detailed occupation codes that we need to use in our study changed over the
period. More specifically, before 1983, the CPS follows the 1970 census for the detailed occupation codes,
but from 1983 until 2002 the CPS follows those of the 1980 census. These codes cannot be directly
converted without introducing some inaccuracies due to the imputation.15
Secondly, we use the CPS Job Training Supplement questions conducted in January 1983 to
categorize the investment characteristics of diﬀerent occupations.16 By starting our data series after
January 1983, we have training levels defined before the period that we study the law changes, and hence
these categories are not aﬀected by these law changes. We use these questions in calculating the average
amount of training obtained in each occupation and in classifying occupations into three groups, namely
low-, medium-, and high-investment occupation groups. Although one may argue that levels of training
may change for some occupations once WDLs are introduced, an assumption we make here is that the
high-investment occupations will still be associated with higher levels of training than those associated
15The 2-digit detailed occupation codes are the grouping of the 3-digit ones. There is no one-to-one relationship between the
1970 census occupation codes and the 1980 census occupation codes. The 1980-census-3-digit codes can be imputed from the
1970 ones and vice versa (See U.S. Bureau of the Census Technical Paper 59). However, imputation will inevitably introduce
some inaccuracies. Thus, we decide not to do it here.
16The CPS Job Training Supplement questions were also asked in January 1984 and in January 1991.
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with the medium- and the low-investment occupations. We assume that the medium-investment
occupations will still be associated with higher levels of training than those associated with the
low-investment occupations. In other words, we assume that each occupation will not be re-categorized
into other categories once the laws are introduced.17
The CPS Job Training Supplements gather detailed information about the training that workers
needed to obtain to earn their jobs and about the training that workers received to improve their skills
once on those jobs. More specifically, we are interested in the questions regarding the training which
full-time workers received after obtaining their current jobs. Such questions are as follows:
1. SINCE YOU OBTAINED YOUR PRESENT JOB, DID YOU TAKE ANY TRAINING TO
IMPROVE YOUR SKILLS? (YES, NO, N/A)
2. (IF YES TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION): DID YOU TAKE THE TRAINING IN:
(a) A SCHOOL? (YES, N/A)
i. (IF YES TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION): DID YOUR EMPLOYER PAY FOR THE
TRAINING? (YES, NO, N/A)
(b) A FORMAL COMPANY TRAINING PROGRAM? (YES, N/A)
(c) INFORMAL ON-THE-JOB TRAINING? (YES, N/A)
From the survey questions, we cannot clearly identify whether the training that the worker received
was general or specific.18 However, in general if the labor market is competitive, then we expect the firm to
pay for any relationship specific investments, while the worker would pay for general training.19 Even so, in
terms of the predicted impact of the law, workers with greater investments have longer tenure, so we would
expect employment protection to have a more positive eﬀect in any job for which there is additional
training. With the above training information, we can calculate, for each occupation, the following:
1. Fraction of workers who received any kind of training (any training criterion)
2. Fraction of workers who received employer paid school training (school training criterion)
3. Fraction of workers who received formal company training (formal training criterion)
4. Fraction of workers who received informal on-the-job training (informal training criterion)
These are four types of criteria of investment . It is worth noting that the universe of the Job
Training Supplements contains the employed workers (both at work and not at work) and the unemployed
workers who have worked in the past. Question 1 (above) is asked only to the employed workers who are at
work. To calculate the fraction of workers who received any kind of training, we count the number of
workers who answer YES divided by the number of workers who respond to the question by answering YES
or NO20 (i.e., we exclude the non-responses). For questions 2-a, 2-b, and 2-c, we can only identify whether
the respondents answer YES to the questions. We cannot distinguish between NO and non-response, so we
treat both to be NO. The fractions are the count of the number of workers who answer YES to the
17We use the January 1991 Job Training Supplement to verify this and find that the grouping of the occupations changes
very little.
18According to Becker (1975), general training improves workers’ skills that are useful anywhere. Specific training improves
workers’ skills that are useful only at current employer.
19 See Parent (2000) for some evidence in support of this hypothesis as predicted by the model of MacLeod and Malcomson
(1993).
20We use the January supplement weight (adjusted for supplement noninterviewed) in calculating the fractions.
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question divided by the number of workers who respond to question 1.21 We suppose that the fractions we
calculate are acceptable approximates of average intensity of the training generally acquired by employees
in each occupation.
The rankings of the occupations by each of the above criteria are illustrated in Table 2 (2A, 2B,
2C, and 2D). According to the rankings, occupations are classified into groups of high, medium, and low
investment. In Table 2A, occupations are ranked using the any training criterion. Observe that there is a
great deal of variation in the level of training, ranging from more than 70% in the case of high school
teachers and health diagnostic technicians to 5% in private household service workers. In Table 2B and 2C,
occupations are ranked by the school training and by the formal training criteria respectively. With only a
few exceptions, the rankings by these three criteria (any training, school training, and formal training) are
quite similar. Examples of occupations classified as low investment are private household service workers,
cleaning and building service workers, motor vehicle operators, equipment cleaners, machine operators, and
construction laborers. These occupations are generally low-skilled and do not require much education. On
the other hand, for the high-investment group, occupations are generally high-skilled and require at least
some college education. Examples of these are engineers, mathematical and computer scientists, health
technologists, health diagnosing technicians, and natural scientists. Examples of medium-investment
occupations are secretaries, computer equipment operators, mechanics, and repairers.
In Table 2D, occupations are ranked by the informal training criterion. The grouping of
occupations under this criterion is very diﬀerent from that of the first three criteria. It will be interesting
to see if this variable provides any useful information given the subjective nature of the interpretation and
the response to the informal training question.
In occupations associated with higher investment, we expect longer employment relationships
between workers and employers. Our expectation is supported by the data from the January 1987 CPS Job
Tenure Supplement. Table 3 illustrates average tenure (months consecutively working for current employer)
by occupation groups categorized by the any training criterion. Of all 50 states, we observe that average
tenure for the high-investment group is longer than that of the low-investment group in 46 states.
Although we find about 25 states that have the exact order of the longest average tenure for
high-investment and the lowest average tenure for low-investment (where average tenure for the medium
group is exactly in the middle), we only have 1 state that has the exact opposite order. Also, in 30 states,
high-investment occupations have longer average tenure than medium-investment occupations, and in 44
states, medium-investment occupations have longer average tenure than low-investment occupations.
Rosen (1968) also documents empirically using the data on class-I railroad workers in the U.S. that workers
who have higher specific investment by firm generally have lower employment variation than workers with
lower specific investment.
In preparing the monthly employment data, we calculate each occupation group’s employment in
each state divided by the state population. The occupation questions are asked to the people in the labor
force and to the people who are not in the labor force but who have worked prior to the time of the
interview. Thus, a number of observations are missing information on occupations due to the fact that
these people are not asked about their occupations. They are still, however, considered population of the
states, so we include them in our denominator along with the unemployed and with people not in the labor
force when calculating each occupation group’s employment per state population. Our monthly
employment data series run from February 1983 until December 1994, keeping the January 1983 training
information exogenous from our regression. In preparing the data for the wage regressions, we calculate the
average real wage for each occupation group by state. Our monthly wage data series also start in February
21We do this so that the workers taken into account for calculating the fractions (2), (3), and (4) are consistent with the
workers taken into account for calculating fraction (1). Note that the workers who answer NO to question 1 are not asked
question 2-a, 2-b, and 2-c, but they would have answered NO to these questions anyway.
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1983 and end in December 1994.
5 Empirical Methodology
As Krueger (1991) and Dertouzos and Karoly (1992) have pointed out, the adoption of WDLs may not be
completely exogenous. Situations that happened in each state and also each state’s characteristics may
have driven the adoption of the laws. However, Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2004) observe that unless
one can find some valid instruments to address the problem, the instrumental variable estimation will bias
the estimates. In this paper, we address the possibility of endogenous adoption decisions by including state
fixed-eﬀects and state-specific time trends (along with time fixed eﬀects) in our regressions. These variables
capture the unobserved state characteristics that change over time and may be correlated with the state’s
decision to adopt the laws. In our analysis, we use case law classification of WDLs (identification of WDLs
adoption dates) developed by Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006).22
To study the eﬀects of the laws on employment of each occupation group, we employ the following
model:
ln(yjst) = α+ η0xjst + β1 ·Adoptst + β2 ·Adoptst × Lowj + β3 ·Adoptst ×Highj
+Lowj +Highj + Lowj × t+Highj × t+ δt + πs + πs × t+ jst (5)
where yjst is occupation group j’s employment per state s population at time t (month-year). xjst is the
vector of observable characteristics of each occupation group. These characteristics are a fraction of male
workers, a fraction of black workers, a fraction of workers in each age group (18-35, and 36-55), a fraction
of married workers, a fraction of unionized workers, and a fraction of workers in each education group (high
school graduates, some college, and college education or higher). Adoptst is the dummy indicating whether
the state is currently adopting the law. This dummy is set to 1 starting the month right after the initial
adoption. Lowj and Highj are the dummies denoting whether the observation belongs to the
low-investment or the high-investment group, respectively. These dummies will capture the employment
level diﬀerence between the high-investment occupations and the low-investment occupations (relative to
the medium-investment occupations).
Observing the model, the eﬀect of the laws on employment of the medium-investment group will
be shown by the coeﬃcient of the Adoptst variable (β1) where the eﬀects of the laws on employment of the
low-investment and the high-investment groups are explained by β1 + β2 and β1 + β3, respectively. One
may argue, according to the U.S. labor market experience over our data period, that the high-skilled sector
may have been expanding, and the low-skilled sector may have been contracting. If that is the case, then
our sector-specific time trends (Lowj × t and Highj × t) should capture such phenomena. We should
expect to see a negative and significant coeﬃcient for the low-investment-occupation-group trend and a
positive and significant coeﬃcient for the high-investment-occupation-group trend.
The δt’s, and πs’s are time fixed eﬀects and state fixed eﬀects, while the πs × t’s are the
state-specific time trends. We will do our regression analysis for each type of WDL for each investment
criterion. We also run the regressions with and without the set of group controls (xjst’s).
The eﬀects of WDLs on each occupation group’s average wage are estimated using the following
model:
22As mentioned earlier, this information is summarized in Table 1.
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ln(wjst) = α+ η0xjst + β1 ·Adoptst + β2 ·Adoptst × Lowj + β3 ·Adoptst ×Highj
+Lowj +Highj + Lowj × t+Highj × t+ δt + πs + πs × t+ jst (6)
where wjst is the average real wage for occupation group j in state s at time t (month-year). Other
variables included in this model are analogous to the ones included in the employment model. Similarly,
the eﬀects of the laws on the average wage for the medium-investment group are captured by β1. The
eﬀects of the laws on the average wage for the low-investment and the high-investment group are captured
by β1 + β2 and β1 + β3 respectively. Now, the sector-specific trends (Lowj × t and Highj × t) will capture
whether wages in each sector have evolved trend-like over time. As performed with the employment
analysis, we will examine the eﬀects of each type of WDL under each criterion of investment separately,
with and without the occupation group controls (xjst’s).
We use the weighted least square procedure in our analysis. The reason for weighing is to achieve
some eﬃciency gain since the cell-mean data are used as the dependent variables. Thus, the error terms are
suspected to be heteroskedastic. The employment regression is weighed by the square root of the number
of observations that belong to each occupation group in each state. For the wage regression, we use the
square root of the number of observations that belong to each occupation group in each state that have
valid wage information (number of observations used to compute the average wage value in each
occupation group-state cell) as the weight.
As Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) have pointed out, we cannot reject the possibility
that the error terms of our data series (both employment and wage) are serially correlated. The serial
correlations will make the standard errors calculated by the usual method biased towards zero. Therefore,
we cluster our standard errors by state (Huber-White robust standard errors) to allow such possible
correlation of the error terms over time and within state. We assume that the error terms in diﬀerent
states are independent.
6 Results
6.1 Good Faith Exception to Employment At-Will
Table 4 reports the eﬀect of the good faith exception upon employment (Table 4A) and upon wages (Table
4B) using each of the four criteria of investment. Starting with the employment results in Table 4A, the
first two columns are the results when the any training criterion measure of investment is used. The eﬀect
of good faith on employment of the medium group (Adopt) is positive and significant at the magnitude
4.8% in the model without occupation group controls (Column 1). The eﬀect remains significant, but the
magnitude is reduced to about 3.1% when the occupation group controls are included (Column 2). The
eﬀect of the law on employment of the low-investment group relative to the medium-investment group
(Adopt× Low) is negative and significant. The magnitude is 15.3% without the controls and reduces to
10.6% with the controls. The overall eﬀect of good faith on the low group is illustrated by
Adopt+Adopt× Low. The T statistic is significant at 1% when no characteristic control is included and
the significance reduces to 5% when the controls are included. With the controls, the good faith exception
reduces the employment of the low-investment occupation group by approximately 7.5%. The magnitude is
10.6% in the model without controls. For the high-investment group, good faith has an overall positive and
significant eﬀect on employment. The magnitude is 11.4% in the model without the controls and 12.7% in
the model with the controls.
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Looking at the coeﬃcient of each group’s dummy and each group’s time trend, we observe a
negative and significant (at 1%) coeﬃcient for High. This means that the high-investment occupation
group is generally smaller than the medium- and the low-investment groups. The coeﬃcient for Low is not
significant; therefore, the sizes of the low group and the medium group are not significantly diﬀerent. The
negative coeﬃcient of the low-investment-group time trend (Low × t) and the positive coeﬃcient of the
high-group time trend (High× t) are very significant (at 1%) as expected. This supports our earlier
argument that we expect the low-investment sector to contract and the high-investment sector to expand
over our data period. Other characteristic controls that have significant coeﬃcients do not have unexpected
signs.
Column 3 and Column 4 display the regression results when the school training criterion is used to
categorize the occupations into groups. The results under this criterion show no significant eﬀects of good
faith on the employment of the medium group. The overall eﬀects of the law on the employment of the
low-investment group are negative at the magnitude of 9.6% in the model with controls and 11.7% in the
model without controls. On the other hand, the good faith law is associated with the increase in the
employment of the high-investment group at the magnitude of 14.5% in the model with controls and 14.6%
in the model without controls.
The results under the formal training criterion are illustrated in Column 5 and in Column 6.
There, we again observe the positive eﬀects of good faith on the employment of the high- and the
medium-investment occupation groups, and we observe the negative eﬀects of good faith on the
employment of the low-investment occupation group. Good faith reduces low-investment occupations’
employment by about 7.1% in the model with controls and 10.2% in the model without controls. On the
other hand, good faith increases medium-investment occupations’ employment by about 3.4% in the model
with controls and 4.2% in the model without controls, and it increases high-investment occupations’
employment by about 6.5% in the model with controls and 10.5% in the model without controls.
On the other hand, under the informal training criterion (Column 7 and Column 8), we find no
significant eﬀects of good faith on employment of any group. This is probably because the respondents’
answers to the informal training question are spurious. Compared to other questions regarding training,
the informal training question is less clear in the sense that the respondents may not be given a definition
of informal training. For example, some may interpret that learning-by-doing in the workplace is
considered informal training, but others may not believe so. Therefore, the classification of occupations
into groups under this criterion may not be a reliable method to quantify investment.
Looking at the joint test of significance of all of the adoption variables
(Adopt = Adopt×Low = Adopt×High = 0), we can reject the null hypothesis that these variables are not
significant at 11.9% for the first three criteria. However, under the informal training criterion, the F
statistics are quite small and we cannot reject the null.
Now, we turn to the visual illustration of employment per population of the low-investment and of
the high-investment groups in the states that adopted good faith during our data period. Figure 3
demonstrates such graphs where occupation groups are categorized using the any training criterion. Across
all 7 states (Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Wyoming), we observe that the
low-investment group constitutes a larger sector compared to the high-investment group. We observe small
negative trends for the employment per population of the low-investment group and small positive trends
for that of the high-investment group in some states. As mentioned earlier, these trends are captured by
the variables Low × t and High× t in our model. From our results, we still observe very large and very
significant eﬀects of good faith even though the adoption of good faith only occurred in seven states during
our data period. Thus, the good faith law itself must have some considerable impacts on the employment
relationships in the U.S. labor market.
16
Table 4B reports the eﬀects of the good faith law on wages. Across all criteria of investment, we do
not observe any significant eﬀects of the law on wages.23 We observe that low-investment occupations are
associated with lower wages and that high-investment occupations are associated with higher wages
(negative and significant coeﬃcients for Low and positive and significant coeﬃcients for High). Except for
the informal training criterion, we observe positive and significant trends for wages of the high-investment
group, and negative and significant trends for wages of the low-investment group. This probably illustrates
the higher demand and the increased return in the high-skilled sector over the period.
In most models (all except Column 4), the joint F-tests of the adoption variables illustrate that we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that these adoption variables are insignificant.
To conclude, most of the point estimates indicate a positive employment eﬀect of the law for
high-investment occupations and a negative employment eﬀect for low-investment occupations. The eﬀect
on wages is very small and hardly significant. Under the assumption that the market is competitive, these
results combined with the employment results suggest an overall negative eﬀect of the law for
low-investment occupations and positive welfare for high-investment occupations.
6.2 Implied Contract Exception to Employment At-Will
Table 5 reports the results of the eﬀects of the implied contract exception. Observing the eﬀects on
employment in Table 5A, we find a negative eﬀect of the law on the employment of the low-investment
group (5.9%) under the any training criterion. The eﬀect is, however, no longer significant once the
occupation group characteristic controls are included. Under the school training criterion, we observe a
small negative eﬀect of the law on the employment of the medium-investment group. The magnitude is
2.6% in the model without controls. The negative eﬀect remains significant once the controls are included,
and the magnitude increases to 3.6%. We also observe a positive eﬀect on the employment of the
high-investment occupation group. The magnitude is 5.3% without controls, but the eﬀect is no longer
significant when we include the controls. The informal training criterion shows some negative eﬀects of the
law on the employment of the medium-occupation group. The magnitude is 4.1% in the model without the
controls and 3.0% in the model with the controls.
As observed in the results of the good faith law on employment, we generally observe positive and
significant trends for the high-investment occupations and negative and significant trends for
low-investment occupations. Except for the model using formal training criterion with controls and the
model using informal training criterion with controls, we can reject the null hypothesis that all the
adoption variables are insignificant (at 10%).
Table 5B reports the eﬀects of the implied contract law on wages. Under the any training and
school training criteria, we observe some limited evidence of positive wage eﬀects. Under the any training
criterion, we observe 0.8% (only 10% significant) increase in wage of the medium group in the model where
characteristic controls are included (Column 2). Under the school training criterion, we observe 1.2% (only
10% significant) increase in wage of the high group in the model where characteristic controls are included
(Column 4). Under the formal training criterion, we also observe 1.0% increase in wage (significant at 10%)
of the medium group in the model without controls, and the eﬀect is 1.3% (significant at 5%) when the
controls are included.
Again, we observe positive and significant trends for wages of the high-investment sector and
negative and significant trends for wages of the low-investment sector. This is true across the first three
criteria of investment. The joint significant F test values (the null hypothesis is that all the adoption
23besides the 10% significant eﬀects on the medium group’s wage under the school training criterion (Column 3) and under the
formal training criterion (Column 5), both of which are no longer significant once the occupation group characteristic controls
are included in the models.
17
variables are zero) are large only for some model (Column 1, Column 5, Column 6, Column 7, and Column
8), thus we can only reject the null hypothesis under these models.
6.3 Public Policy Exception to Employment At-Will
The results from the good faith and from the implied contract exceptions have suggested, at some level of
precision, that the employment of the high-investment group is positively aﬀected by the laws and that the
employment of the low-investment group is negatively aﬀected by the laws. We have already argued that
our sector trend variables would help to capture the episodes of the contraction of the low-skilled sector and
of the expansion of the high-skilled sector during our data period, and thus our coeﬃcients of the adoption
variables must have been accurate measures of the eﬀects of the laws and not the illustration of the trends.
As we discussed above, the public policy exception is not intended to remediate the eﬃciency of
the employment relationship, but rather it restricts the actions of employers to protect existing public
policy. As shown in Figure 1 and in Figure 2, many states adopted this type of exception during our data
period. The group of states that adopted the public policy rule is similar to the group that adopted the
implied contract rule. Table 6A shows that the law has virtually no eﬀect on the employment of the low-
nor of the high-investment groups (this is true across all criteria of investment). We obtain a similar result
for wages, as shown in Table 6B.
These results act as a control for the employment results from the good faith and the implied
contract exceptions. Basically, if the results from the above sections are spurious correlations with
employment trends of the low-investment and high-investment occupations, then we should observe similar
patterns here. Since we do not, this would lend additional support to the hypothesis that the good faith
and implied contract exceptions enhance the employment of the high-investment occupations and reduce
the employment of the low-investment occupations.
7 Additional Results for Good Faith and Implied Contract
We further question whether the eﬀects of the laws are diﬀerent in highly populated areas from those in
less populated areas. In highly populated areas, labor markets are more competitive, and hence there is
likely to be more turnover for all types of workers. As a consequence, the eﬀect of the law is likely to be
more negative. Moreover, in a more competitive environment, there are fewer rents. Therefore, firms with
poor management are more likely to be selected out by the market, which would further attenuate any
positive eﬀects of employment protection.
In contrast, in low population areas labor is more scarce, and the idiosyncratic match component is
likely to be larger. Moreover, with less competition, there would be less selection against poor management
and hence a greater scope for the law to enhance productivity. This suggests that we should observe
variations in the impact of these laws depending upon whether one is in a rural or urban area.
We explore this by first restricting the sample to highly populated areas as defined by the
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) with population one million or more for our 1983 and 1984
data and to the areas belonging to the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) with population one million or
more for our 1985 data onwards. This complexity is due to the change in the definition of metropolitan
area defined by the Oﬃce of Management and Budget (OMB) over the period. We show graphically the
states that contain the highly populated areas in Figure 4. The results of the eﬀects of the laws by areas
are discussed below.
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7.1 Good Faith Exception to Employment At-Will
Table 7A shows the results of the eﬀects of the good faith exception on employment in highly populated
areas.24 There, we observe some positive eﬀects of the law on the employment of the high-investment
occupation group when the school training criterion is used. The positive eﬀect is about 5.7% (significant
at 10%) in the model without the controls and such eﬀect increases to 6.5% (significant at 5%) when the
controls are added. We observe some negative eﬀects of the law on the employment of the low-investment
occupation group when the informal training criterion is used. The magnitude is 4.2% when no controls are
added, and the magnitude becomes 4.6% when the controls are added. There seem to be no eﬀects of the
law on the employment of the medium group.25
Table 7B illustrates the wage eﬀects in highly populated areas. Across all measures of investment,
we observe negative wage eﬀects for all groups of occupations. When the any training criterion is used, the
magnitude of the negative eﬀect is 6.6% for the low-investment group, 5.2% for the medium-investment
group, and 4.0% for the high-investment group in the model with controls. In the model without controls,
only the negative eﬀect for the low-investment group is significant (the magnitude is 4.1%). When the
school training criterion is used, the magnitude of the negative eﬀect is 6.5% for the low-investment group,
3.8% for the medium-investment group, and 3.4% for the high-investment group in the model with
controls. In the model without controls, only the negative eﬀect for the low-investment group is significant
(the magnitude is 4.1%). Under the formal training criterion, the magnitude of the negative eﬀect is 5.7%
for the low-investment group, 3.9% for the medium-investment group, and 3.9% for the high-investment
group in the model with controls. In the model without controls, only the negative eﬀect for the
low-investment group is significant (the magnitude is 3.0%). For the informal training, the negative eﬀect
is 4.1% for the low group, 4.6% for the medium group, and 3.9% for the high group in the model with
controls (no significant results in the model without controls).
The eﬀects of the good faith exception in less populated areas (population less than 1 million) are
illustrated in Table 8. For employment (Table 8A), we observe similar pattern across all models except for
the ones using the informal training criterion. We see positive employment eﬀects for the high-investment
group and negative employment eﬀects for the low-investment group. The magnitudes of the negative
eﬀects vary between 9.7% (formal training criterion with controls) to 12.1% (school training criterion
without controls). The magnitudes of the positive eﬀects vary between 10.2% (formal training criterion
with controls) to 15.5% (school training criterion without controls). We also find some positive eﬀects for
the medium-investment group when the any training and the formal training criteria are used. The
magnitude is 4.4% for the any training criterion with controls (4.2% without controls) and 4.1% for the
formal training criterion with controls (3.8% without controls).
Table 8B illustrates the wage eﬀects of the good faith exception in less populated areas. There, we
observe some positive significant wage eﬀects for the medium investment group. The magnitude ranges
from 1.5% (any training with controls) to 2.9% (informal training without controls).
In sum, the eﬀects of the good faith exception on employment in highly populated areas and in less
populated areas seem to be consistent with our employment results in the previous section (overall area).
The results from less populated areas, however, seem to show a clearer pattern of positive employment
eﬀects for the high-investment occupations and negative employment eﬀects for the low-investment
occupations. The eﬀects on wages are, however, diﬀerent by areas. In the previous section, we observe
virtually no eﬀects on wages in overall area. In this section, we find negative wage eﬀects in highly
24Among seven states (Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Wyoming) that adopted the good faith
exception during our data period, only two states (Delaware and Arizona) contained highly populated areas.
25The 10-percent-significant positive eﬀects in Column 5 and in Column 7 are no longer significant once the controls are
added.
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populated areas for all occupation groups. For less populated areas, we find some evidence of positive wage
eﬀects for some occupation group.
This suggests that the law has a more negative eﬀect in the more highly populated areas, as we
predicted above.
7.2 Implied Contract Exception to Employment At-Will
Table 9A provides the estimated impacts of the implied contract exception on employment in highly
populated areas. Again, we observe a clear pattern of negative employment eﬀects for the low-investment
occupation group across all four criteria of investment. The magnitudes of the eﬀects range from 4.8%
(informal training without controls) to 8.0% (any training without controls). The positive employment
eﬀects for the high-investment occupations are observed only under the school training criterion. The
magnitude is 4.9% in the model without controls and 5.2% in the model with controls. The negative
employment eﬀects for the medium-investment group are found under the any training criterion at the
magnitude of 2.6% (without controls) and under the school training criterion at the magnitude of 4.9%
(with and without controls).
The wage eﬀects of the implied contract exception in highly populated areas are shown in Table
9B. We find some negative wage eﬀects for the low-investment occupation group. The magnitude is 2.4%
under the school training criterion (with controls) and 1.8% under the formal training criterion (with
controls). However, we find no wage eﬀects for other occupation groups.
For less populated areas, the employment results are illustrated in Table 10A. We observe no clear
pattern for the impact of the law on employment. Under the school training criterion, we find negative
impacts of the law on the medium-investment group’s employment. The magnitudes are 3.2% (without
controls) and 3.5% (with controls). The informal training criterion gives bizarre estimates of positive
employment eﬀects for the low-investment occupation group and of negative employment eﬀects for the
high-investment occupation group; although, these are no longer significant when the controls are included.
This is probably consistent with our earlier expectation that the informal training question does not
provide a good measure of investment.
Table 10B shows the impacts of the law on wages in less populated areas. We find some limited
positive eﬀects of the law on the wages of the low-investment occupation group. The eﬀects are, however,
no longer significant once the controls are included. We also find some positive significant wage eﬀects on
the wages of the medium-investment occupation group under the informal training criterion (2.3% without
controls, and 1.7% with controls).
In sum, similar to the results found in the previous section (implied contract law in overall area),
the positive employment eﬀects for the high-investment group and the negative employment eﬀects for the
low-investment group are also found in highly populated areas. For wages, we find some evidences of the
negative eﬀects of the law in highly populated areas and find some limited evidence of the positive eﬀect of
the law in less populated areas.
8 Concluding Discussion
The question we have addressed in this paper is whether or not there are any beneficial eﬀects from the
introduction of exceptions to employment at-will. The traditional economic view supposes that, in a
competitive economy, employers and employees write the contracts that they intend, and hence there can
be no role for the courts beyond enforcing the agreements as written.
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The view from the court room is rather diﬀerent. There, we see disputes between disgruntled
employees and employers who are not always exemplary in either their behavior or in their ability to
properly manage their employees. If these cases are simply extreme and unusual situations, then we would
not expect the introduction of new legal default rules to have much eﬀect. The good faith exception is
primarily aimed at requiring employers to compensate employees as they have agreed and not try to
dismiss employees in an opportunistic fashion. For this law, we find consistently positive employment
eﬀects upon the employment of skilled workers.
The economic consequences of the implied contract exception are less clear since the law does not
always provide clear criteria for either the existence of a long term contract or for what exactly constitutes
a just cause. However, even given the apparent vagueness of the rule, we find that in some cases it has a
positive eﬀect on highly skilled workers, though - as with the good faith rule - the eﬀect for low skilled
occupations is negative. It is interesting to note that we find no eﬀect of the public policy exception upon
employment for the full sample, suggesting that the eﬀect of the law change is not simply a correlation
with employment growth.26
Our results are consistent with earlier evidence that finds that changes in employment law have
either a negative or small eﬀect. The new point here is that for some occupations the eﬀect may in fact be
positive. These results are of course quite preliminary. If they are confirmed by future research, they
suggest that exceptions to employment at-will should depend upon the extent of the employee’s investment
in job specific skills. These results are consistent with the view that the common law evolves to find
eﬃcient solutions to cases that are adjudicated in court (see Posner (2003)).
The results also provide some much needed evidence for the debate on the role of legal defaults in
contract law. The standard presumption in law and in economics is that rational parties write contracts
best suited for their situation, and hence there is a limited scope for legal intervention beyond merely
enforcing the contract as written (see for example the excellent paper by Schwartz and Scott (2003)).
There is very little empirical work that explicitly addresses this important issue. Our empirical results
suggest that courts can, under the appropriate conditions, enhance the operation of the marketplace,
particularly when markets are not perfectly competitive.
26We ran the regressions exploring the eﬀect of the public policy exception for high and low population areas. There we found
a negative eﬀect upon employment in only the high population areas, a result that is consistent with earlier work.
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Figure 3: Employment per Population for States Adopting Good Faith Exception during 1983-1994 











Figure 4A: States that contain “Highly populated area”  
SMSA with population 1M+ (1983-1984) 
 





Figure 4B: States that contain “Highly populated area” 
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Table 1: Adoption Dates 
 
State Implied Contract Public Policy Good Faith Remarks 
ALABAMA AL 7/1987       
ALASKA AK 5/1983 2/1986 5/1983   
ARIZONA  AZ 6/1983 6/1985 6/1985   
ARKANSAS AR 6/1984 3/1980     
CALIFORNIA  CA 3/1972 9/1959 10/1980   
COLORADO  CO 10/1983 9/1985     
CONNECTICUT CT 10/1985 1/1980 6/1980   
DELAWARE DE   3/1992 4/1992   
FLORIDA FL         
GEORGIA GA         
HAWAII HI 8/1986 10/1982     
IDAHO ID 4/1977 4/1977 8/1989   
ILLINOIS IL 12/1974 12/1978     
INDIANA IN 8/1987 5/1973     
IOWA IA 11/1987 7/1985     
KANSAS KS 8/1984 6/1981     
KENTUCKY KY 8/1983 11/1983     
LOUISIANA LA     1/1998   
MAINE ME 11/1977       
MARYLAND MD 1/1985 7/1981     
MASSACHUSETTS MA 5/1988 5/1980 7/1977   
MICHIGAN MI 6/1980 6/1976     
MINNESOTA MN 4/1983 11/1986     
MISSISSIPPI MS 6/1992 7/1987     
MISSOURI MO 1/1983 11/1985   End Implied Contract in 2/1988 
MONTANA MT 6/1987 1/1980 1/1982   
NEBRASKA NE 11/1983 11/1987     
NEVADA NV 8/1983 1/1984 2/1987   
NEW HAMPSHIRE NH 8/1988 2/1974 2/1974 End Good Faith in 5/1980 
NEW JERSEY NJ 5/1985 7/1980     
NEW MEXICO NM 2/1980 7/1983     
NEW YORK NY 11/1982       
NORTH CAROLINA NC   5/1985     
NORTH DAKOTA ND 2/1984 11/1987     
OHIO OH 4/1982 3/1990     
OKLAHOMA OK 12/1976 2/1989 5/1985 End Good Faith in 2/1989 
OREGON OR 3/1978 6/1975     
PENNSYLVANIA PA   3/1974     
RHODE ISLAND RI         
SOUTH CAROLINA SC 6/1987 11/1985     
SOUTH DAKOTA SD 4/1983 12/1988     
TENNESSEE TN 11/1981 8/1984     
TEXAS TX 4/1985 6/1984     
UTAH UT 5/1986 3/1989     
VERMONT VT 8/1985 9/1986     
VIRGINIA  VA 9/1983 6/1985     
WASHINGTON WA 8/1977 7/1984     
WEST VIRGINIA WV 4/1986 7/1978     
WISCONSIN WI 6/1985 1/1980     
WYOMING WY 8/1985 7/1989 1/1994   
 
Source: Summarized from Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006)’s Legal Appendix 
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 Table 2A: Fraction of Workers Received any Kind of Training after Obtaining Current Job 
 
Occupation Code Occupation Fraction of workers received any kind of training after obtaining current job Group 
27 Private Household Service Occupations 0.0544938 
38 Motor Vehicle Operators 0.1389347 
31 Cleaning and Building Service Occupations 0.1481309 
41 Freight, Stock and Material Handlers 0.1481502 
45 Forestry and Fishing Occupations 0.1483199 
44 Farm Workers and Related Occupations 0.1560583 
29 Food Service Occupations 0.1584234 
42 Other Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, and Laborers 0.1727826 
40 Construction Laborers 0.1735819 
43 Farm Operators and Managers 0.2040806 
36 Machine Operators and Tenders, Except Precision 0.2259195 
19 Sales Workers, Retail and Personal Services 0.2275931 
39 Other Transportation Occupations and Material Moving 0.2478085 
37 Fabricators, Assemblers, Inspectors, and Samplers 0.2557604 
34 Construction Trades 0.2847712 
Low 
 
25 Mail and Message Distributing 0.3050183 
23 Secretaries, Stenographers, and Typists 0.307571 
24 Financial Records, Processing Occupations 0.311928 
16 Supervisors and Proprietors, Sales Occupations 0.3471562 
32 Personal Service Occupations 0.3598349 
35 Other Precision Production Occupations 0.375325 
26 Other Administrative Support Occupations, Including Clerical 0.3822806 
18 Sales Representatives Commodities, Except Retail 0.4198851 
30 Health Service Occupations 0.4331955 
2 Other Executive, Administrators, and Managers 0.4601972 
33 Mechanics and Repairers 0.4694868 
22 Computer Equipment Operators 0.4787066 
21 Supervisors-Administrative Support 0.5052693 
14 Engineering and Science Technicians 0.5078194 
9 Teachers, College and University 0.5151968 
Medium 
 
20 Sales Related Occupations 0.5169604 
13 Health Technologists and Technicians 0.5297871 
3 Management Related Occupations 0.5339963 
12 Other Professional Specialty Occupations 0.542066 
11 Lawyers and Judges 0.5813953 
15 Technicians, Except Health Engineering, and Science 0.5824444 
4 Engineers 0.5877689 
17 Sales Representatives, Finance, and Business Service 0.6136144 
6 Natural Scientists 0.6139696 
28 Protective Service Occupations 0.6315429 
5 Mathematical and Computer Scientists 0.6743543 
8 Health Assessment and Treating Occupations 0.6800746 
1 Administrators and Officials, Public Administration 0.716915 
7 Health Diagnosing Occupations 0.7292728 




 Table 2B: Fraction of Workers Received (Employer Paid) School Training after Obtaining Current Job 
 
Occupation Code Occupation 
Fraction of workers received  
(employer paid) school training after 
obtaining current job 
Group 
25 Mail and Message Distributing 0 
27 Private Household Service Occupations 0 
41 Freight, Stock and Material Handlers 0 
40 Construction Laborers 0.0063221 
38 Motor Vehicle Operators 0.0068844 
42 Other Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, and Laborers 0.0075406 
31 Cleaning and Building Service Occupations 0.00789 
36 Machine Operators and Tenders, Except Precision 0.0089007 
44 Farm Workers and Related Occupations 0.0096675 
19 Sales Workers, Retail and Personal Services 0.0098459 
39 Other Transportation Occupations and Material Moving 0.0149699 
29 Food Service Occupations 0.0171672 
45 Forestry and Fishing Occupations 0.0254529 
43 Farm Operators and Managers 0.026601 
37 Fabricators, Assemblers, Inspectors, and Samplers 0.0281746 
Low 
 
32 Personal Service Occupations 0.0309196 
30 Health Service Occupations 0.034261 
34 Construction Trades 0.0361907 
16 Supervisors and Proprietors, Sales Occupations 0.0378588 
33 Mechanics and Repairers 0.0392179 
26 Other Administrative Support Occupations, Including Clerical 0.0428515 
23 Secretaries, Stenographers, and Typists 0.0506456 
35 Other Precision Production Occupations 0.0512298 
18 Sales Representatives Commodities, Except Retail 0.0559219 
24 Financial Records, Processing Occupations 0.0560466 
22 Computer Equipment Operators 0.0569106 
11 Lawyers and Judges 0.0628524 
17 Sales Representatives, Finance, and Business Service 0.0741983 
13 Health Technologists and Technicians 0.0762671 
8 Health Assessment and Treating Occupations 0.0820884 
Medium 
 
20 Sales Related Occupations 0.083898 
2 Other Executive, Administrators, and Managers 0.0872607 
21 Supervisors-Administrative Support 0.0927648 
12 Other Professional Specialty Occupations 0.0983718 
14 Engineering and Science Technicians 0.1035796 
3 Management Related Occupations 0.1057448 
1 Administrators and Officials, Public Administration 0.116992 
15 Technicians, Except Health Engineering, and Science 0.1187169 
9 Teachers, College and University 0.1224448 
7 Health Diagnosing Occupations 0.128199 
10 Teachers, Except College and University 0.1318544 
28 Protective Service Occupations 0.1384961 
4 Engineers 0.149489 
5 Mathematical and Computer Scientists 0.1637195 




 Table 2C: Fraction of Workers Received Formal Company Training after Obtaining Current Job 
 
Occupation Code Occupation 
Fraction of workers received formal 
company training after obtaining 
current job 
Group 
43 Farm Operators and Managers 0.0175515 
29 Food Service Occupations 0.0220365 
27 Private Household Service Occupations 0.0226557 
44 Farm Workers and Related Occupations 0.0227975 
41 Freight, Stock and Material Handlers 0.0260338 
31 Cleaning and Building Service Occupations 0.0296611 
40 Construction Laborers 0.0303548 
42 Other Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, and Laborers 0.0337012 
36 Machine Operators and Tenders, Except Precision 0.0362584 
9 Teachers, College and University 0.0415534 
38 Motor Vehicle Operators 0.0458973 
45 Forestry and Fishing Occupations 0.0475126 
37 Fabricators, Assemblers, Inspectors, and Samplers 0.0548318 
19 Sales Workers, Retail and Personal Services 0.0653655 
24 Financial Records, Processing Occupations 0.070279 
Low 
 
39 Other Transportation Occupations and Material Moving 0.075374 
34 Construction Trades 0.0762882 
7 Health Diagnosing Occupations 0.0822099 
23 Secretaries, Stenographers, and Typists 0.0826247 
25 Mail and Message Distributing 0.0828437 
10 Teachers, Except College and University 0.0961728 
32 Personal Service Occupations 0.1006098 
11 Lawyers and Judges 0.106687 
30 Health Service Occupations 0.1215534 
12 Other Professional Specialty Occupations 0.1334349 
26 Other Administrative Support Occupations, Including Clerical 0.1346527 
35 Other Precision Production Occupations 0.1388943 
16 Supervisors and Proprietors, Sales Occupations 0.1399342 
13 Health Technologists and Technicians 0.1562996 
2 Other Executive, Administrators, and Managers 0.1639372 
Medium 
 
14 Engineering and Science Technicians 0.1878971 
22 Computer Equipment Operators 0.1916446 
3 Management Related Occupations 0.2095282 
18 Sales Representatives Commodities, Except Retail 0.2211782 
20 Sales Related Occupations 0.2230621 
21 Supervisors-Administrative Support 0.2420617 
33 Mechanics and Repairers 0.2428236 
15 Technicians, Except Health Engineering, and Science 0.2572868 
8 Health Assessment and Treating Occupations 0.2588073 
6 Natural Scientists 0.2752914 
4 Engineers 0.2920008 
17 Sales Representatives, Finance, and Business Service 0.2950807 
28 Protective Service Occupations 0.3279191 
1 Administrators and Officials, Public Administration 0.3502091 




 Table 2D: Fraction of Workers Received Informal on-the-job Training after Obtaining Current Job 
 
Occupation Code Occupation 
Fraction of workers received informal 
on-the-job training after obtaining 
current job 
Group 
20 Sales Related Occupations 0 
27 Private Household Service Occupations 0.0336552 
43 Farm Operators and Managers 0.054813 
45 Forestry and Fishing Occupations 0.0628462 
38 Motor Vehicle Operators 0.0734377 
32 Personal Service Occupations 0.0769121 
9 Teachers, College and University 0.0786915 
7 Health Diagnosing Occupations 0.0829758 
31 Cleaning and Building Service Occupations 0.0922231 
44 Farm Workers and Related Occupations 0.0937638 
10 Teachers, Except College and University 0.0949497 
29 Food Service Occupations 0.0999658 
11 Lawyers and Judges 0.1074059 
41 Freight, Stock and Material Handlers 0.1123306 
23 Secretaries, Stenographers, and Typists 0.1165614 
Low 
 
42 Other Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, and Laborers 0.1187727 
40 Construction Laborers 0.1232443 
34 Construction Trades 0.1340891 
24 Financial Records, Processing Occupations 0.1342847 
19 Sales Workers, Retail and Personal Services 0.1357762 
16 Supervisors and Proprietors, Sales Occupations 0.1369977 
2 Other Executive, Administrators, and Managers 0.1494641 
39 Other Transportation Occupations and Material Moving 0.1505784 
6 Natural Scientists 0.1520941 
37 Fabricators, Assemblers, Inspectors, and Samplers 0.1591837 
36 Machine Operators and Tenders, Except Precision 0.1677804 
21 Supervisors-Administrative Support 0.1708288 
12 Other Professional Specialty Occupations 0.1747022 
3 Management Related Occupations 0.1767491 




35 Other Precision Production Occupations 0.1818477 
33 Mechanics and Repairers 0.1840206 
4 Engineers 0.1893195 
14 Engineering and Science Technicians 0.1927129 
8 Health Assessment and Treating Occupations 0.1975016 
26 Other Administrative Support Occupations, Including Clerical 0.1978101 
13 Health Technologists and Technicians 0.1988621 
17 Sales Representatives, Finance, and Business Service 0.2034024 
25 Mail and Message Distributing 0.2188927 
30 Health Service Occupations 0.2285811 
15 Technicians, Except Health Engineering, and Science 0.2380981 
28 Protective Service Occupations 0.2415931 
5 Mathematical and Computer Scientists 0.2467641 
1 Administrators and Officials, Public Administration 0.2600389 




Low Investment Medium Investment High Investment
ALABAMA AL 71.85928 95.93007 94.60897
ALASKA AK 44.91544 61.06683 69.67273
ARIZONA AZ 43.55752 66.84146 71.01797
ARKANSAS AR 76.32993 95.16666 85.32624
CALIFORNIA CA 51.38254 77.85999 89.47134
COLORADO CO 45.5561 83.60738 76.09278
CONNECTICUT CT 75.57391 94.46726 87.44086
DELAWARE DE 63.52968 98.98154 99.73793
FLORIDA FL 48.38214 72.60717 76.60201
GEORGIA GA 64.84536 83.03503 82.71605
HAWAII HI 67.58373 91.41522 104.1677
IDAHO ID 88.90432 87.10069 93.8
ILLINOIS IL 81.57316 94.02778 91.76667
INDIANA IN 90.11579 112.8485 103.2174
IOWA IA 105.0052 96.2381 105.2611
KANSAS KS 85.12337 94.68671 90.28492
KENTUCKY KY 81.75658 115.1985 83.51145
LOUISIANA LA 69.77941 96.36864 93.38519
MAINE ME 77.52049 82.2085 87.78689
MARYLAND MD 73.25267 88.82998 104.4291
MASSACHUSETTS MA 64.27689 89.71149 88.22314
MICHIGAN MI 83.13192 98.72752 95.36842
MINNESOTA MN 79.97472 102.299 91.70139
MISSISSIPPI MS 75 99.07266 99.4875
MISSOURI MO 80.25475 81.79856 90.56221
MONTANA MT 111.2143 80.22005 93.63461
NEBRASKA NE 109.5028 96.87936 100.241
NEVADA NV 46.48052 66.78351 74.128
NEW HAMPSHIRE NH 49.63913 79.24915 81.24219
NEW JERSEY NJ 74.21204 94.26456 93.82388
NEW MEXICO NM 67.82231 76.34193 74.56021
NEW YORK NY 76.90549 96.89936 107.9772
NORTH CAROLINA NC 75.54038 91.58715 92.07049
NORTH DAKOTA ND 114.9864 92.72853 90.99445
OHIO OH 82.75395 101.0155 104.5486
OKLAHOMA OK 79.29964 90.80264 86.96053
OREGON OR 64.87295 79.7874 84.93877
PENNSYLVANIA PA 85.17342 105.1751 108.8861
RHODE ISLAND RI 78.85268 93.75207 93.60545
SOUTH CAROLINA SC 81.83146 113.0135 96.74097
SOUTH DAKOTA SD 114.8813 91.80214 101.9538
TENNESSEE TN 75.65517 97.04575 98.92
TEXAS TX 58.15458 70.83622 76.47369
UTAH UT 50.48235 77.45705 100.858
VERMONT VT 72.72161 81.65019 93.92958
VIRGINIA VA 79.27005 84.22811 91.14634
WASHINGTON WA 56.30213 87.95752 90.33334
WEST VIRGINIA WV 95.05627 116.2244 113.5505
WISCONSIN WI 91.50503 103.0179 111.5723
WYOMING WY 74.40816 74.53036 101.3211
Table 3: Average Tenure by Occupation Group (Low, Medium, High)
Using January 1987 Job Tenure Supplement Data




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(GF) 0.04769*** 0.03084* 0.01602 0.00517 0.04180*** 0.03442** 0.00851 0.01909
(0.01818) (0.01586) (0.01507) (0.01711) (0.01600) (0.01560) (0.02092) (0.02094)
Adopt(GF)xLow -0.15323*** -0.10579** -0.13245*** -0.10088** -0.14348*** -0.10509** -0.05675 -0.06768
(0.05130) (0.04581) (0.05027) (0.05052) (0.04965) (0.04664) (0.06690) (0.06589)
Adopt(GF)xHigh 0.07932** 0.08361** 0.13019*** 0.13958*** 0.06270*** 0.03088 0.03862* 0.02576
(0.03571) (0.03967) (0.02857) (0.02337) (0.02187) (0.02258) (0.02188) (0.02343)
Low -0.03842 0.08549 -0.12523*** 0.01009 -0.19032*** 0.11703* -0.36121*** -0.32638***
(0.02922) (0.07356) (0.02837) (0.06752) (0.02981) (0.06866) (0.02926) (0.06348)
High -0.69975*** -1.24093*** -0.49909*** -0.95214*** -0.81565*** -0.91238*** -0.41121*** -0.29929***
(0.01852) (0.10851) (0.01978) (0.10670) (0.01285) (0.05256) (0.01661) (0.03335)
LowXt -0.00098*** -0.00082*** -0.00071*** -0.00083*** -0.00129*** -0.00125*** -0.00057*** -0.00081***
(0.00013) (0.00021) (0.00012) (0.00021) (0.00013) (0.00021) (0.00012) (0.00017)
HighXt 0.00086*** 0.00099*** 0.00123*** 0.00133*** -0.00013** -0.00036*** 0.00040*** 0.00055***
(0.00009) (0.00016) (0.00009) (0.00019) (0.00006) (0.00010) (0.00009) (0.00010)
%male 0.02499 0.13540 -0.02577 0.69998***
(0.15309) (0.20751) (0.21426) (0.27000)
%black 0.31604 0.10249 0.06945 -0.29700
(0.24825) (0.27232) (0.25660) (0.24633)
%age18-35 -0.55691** -0.37590 -0.48610 -0.58359**
(0.28140) (0.31165) (0.30011) (0.29203)
%age36-55 -0.50272* -0.23262 -0.45837* -0.86699***
(0.29281) (0.31959) (0.27585) (0.28863)
%married -0.22578 -0.06661 -0.13742 0.01101
(0.22267) (0.18963) (0.15323) (0.11247)
%union -0.66118 -0.91275 -0.56566 -0.13489
(0.52568) (0.61369) (0.45116) (0.31220)
%high school education 0.25193 0.55336** 0.50149** -0.53577***
(0.24078) (0.26346) (0.25245) (0.16498)
%some college education -0.19957 0.01116 0.20401 -0.89671***
(0.32873) (0.33022) (0.30201) (0.28533)
%college education and higher 1.60344*** 1.52264*** 1.90197*** -0.64401**
(0.36798) (0.41000) (0.36233) (0.28887)
Constant -1.37015*** -1.11489*** -1.40226*** -1.63952*** -1.26966*** -1.49169*** -1.34302*** -0.59853**
(0.00944) (0.38475) (0.00723) (0.40869) (0.01056) (0.31164) (0.00840) (0.26393)
Observations 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450
R-squared 0.84 0.87 0.72 0.75 0.90 0.92 0.83 0.85
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 -0.10554 -0.07495 -0.11642 -0.09570 -0.10168 -0.07068 -0.04824 -0.04859
T-stat_1 -2.85133 -2.06818 -2.96215 -2.37504 -2.81167 -1.93996 -0.99206 -1.00996
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 0.12701 0.11445 0.14621 0.14476 0.10450 0.06530 0.04713 0.04485
T-stat_2 2.85279 2.58367 3.95955 4.60314 3.03862 1.97239 1.57542 1.49132
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 3.14568 2.47329 7.68504 14.31559 3.09612 1.95092 1.10577 0.89364
Prob > F 0.02403 0.05968 0.00004 0.00000 0.02571 0.11903 0.34526 0.44350
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4A: Good Faith Exception (All Areas) [Dep Var: LN(emp/pop) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(GF) 0.00968 0.00937 0.01786* 0.01584 0.01866* 0.01660 0.01041 0.01060
(0.00965) (0.01144) (0.00931) (0.01048) (0.01003) (0.01216) (0.00910) (0.01139)
Adopt(GF)xLow -0.01194 -0.00748 -0.03330 -0.02566** -0.02969 -0.01881 -0.00141 -0.00049
(0.02121) (0.01230) (0.02231) (0.01272) (0.02085) (0.01508) (0.01107) (0.00891)
Adopt(GF)xHigh 0.01139 0.00618 -0.00539 -0.00029 -0.00503 -0.01181** -0.00561 -0.01032*
(0.01490) (0.01316) (0.01326) (0.01347) (0.00632) (0.00548) (0.01073) (0.00617)
Low -0.29351*** -0.18735*** -0.29926*** -0.19555*** -0.36524*** -0.19511*** -0.30303*** -0.20981***
(0.00866) (0.01025) (0.00824) (0.00822) (0.00805) (0.00840) (0.00827) (0.00982)
High 0.19694*** -0.00314 0.29347*** 0.06162*** 0.18847*** 0.09605*** 0.03057*** 0.02129***
(0.00702) (0.01099) (0.00836) (0.00983) (0.00467) (0.00729) (0.00717) (0.00434)
LowXt -0.00037*** -0.00040*** -0.00025*** -0.00028*** -0.00025*** -0.00024*** 0.00054*** 0.00044***
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00004)
HighXt 0.00046*** 0.00061*** 0.00020*** 0.00040*** 0.00016*** 0.00015*** 0.00005 0.00006*
(0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00004)
%male 0.32344*** 0.28641*** 0.21983*** 0.25069***
(0.01789) (0.02097) (0.01986) (0.02017)
%black -0.11003*** -0.09033*** -0.06340** -0.10110**
(0.02898) (0.03392) (0.03096) (0.04584)
%age18-35 -0.15793*** -0.16113*** -0.16947*** -0.11930***
(0.03067) (0.03345) (0.02737) (0.02180)
%age36-55 0.04615* 0.02913 0.05504** 0.09975***
(0.02709) (0.02944) (0.02256) (0.02647)
%married 0.12987*** 0.13795*** 0.13578*** 0.17806***
(0.02095) (0.01962) (0.01800) (0.01297)
%union 0.28657*** 0.27704*** 0.29199*** 0.27403***
(0.04233) (0.04887) (0.04022) (0.03375)
%high school education 0.33703*** 0.31594*** 0.26953*** 0.21695***
(0.05129) (0.04430) (0.03369) (0.02242)
%some college education 0.39264*** 0.38979*** 0.34450*** 0.37805***
(0.05101) (0.04696) (0.03684) (0.03271)
%college education and higher 0.68443*** 0.67174*** 0.69451*** 0.80976***
(0.05073) (0.04268) (0.03883) (0.02965)
Constant 2.02341*** 1.41997*** 1.98276*** 1.43318*** 2.04735*** 1.48917*** 2.01185*** 1.39934***
(0.00366) (0.03452) (0.00290) (0.03221) (0.00335) (0.03218) (0.00310) (0.03744)
Observations 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450
R-squared 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.84 0.87
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 -0.00226 0.00189 -0.01544 -0.00982 -0.01103 -0.00221 0.00900 0.01011
T-stat_1 -0.12395 0.12048 -0.85795 -0.65347 -0.70923 -0.15888 0.81131 0.80381
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 0.02107 0.01555 0.01247 0.01555 0.01363 0.00479 0.00480 0.00028
T-stat_2 1.04605 0.83118 0.75038 0.88251 1.16141 0.40313 0.43447 0.02369
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 0.45314 0.31001 1.60183 4.65545 1.42083 1.77198 0.48278 1.05443
Prob > F 0.71508 0.81817 0.18664 0.00296 0.23451 0.15011 0.69425 0.36715
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4B: Good Faith Exception (All Areas) [Dep Var: LN(avg wage) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group that have valid wage information]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(IC) -0.00295 -0.01155 -0.02634* -0.03566*** -0.00713 -0.01206 -0.04058** -0.03035*
(0.01400) (0.01088) (0.01379) (0.01131) (0.01540) (0.01512) (0.01741) (0.01612)
Adopt(IC)xLow -0.05559 -0.02754 -0.01871 -0.00141 -0.03244 -0.00973 0.05720 0.04171
(0.04372) (0.03190) (0.04490) (0.03293) (0.04674) (0.03727) (0.03802) (0.03193)
Adopt(IC)xHigh 0.05300** 0.03634 0.07893*** 0.07857*** 0.02912* 0.00945 0.03573 0.02907
(0.02442) (0.02661) (0.02481) (0.02751) (0.01501) (0.01141) (0.02664) (0.02707)
Low -0.03211 0.10258* -0.13413*** 0.02116 -0.19454*** 0.14090** -0.39951*** -0.36558***
(0.02876) (0.05765) (0.03196) (0.06432) (0.03181) (0.06510) (0.02845) (0.06483)
High -0.71351*** -1.25428*** -0.51723*** -0.97646*** -0.81982*** -0.92097*** -0.42324*** -0.31365***
(0.01936) (0.10993) (0.01876) (0.13135) (0.01265) (0.04980) (0.02266) (0.03923)
LowXt -0.00089*** -0.00084*** -0.00071*** -0.00097*** -0.00126*** -0.00128*** -0.00075*** -0.00091***
(0.00020) (0.00024) (0.00019) (0.00024) (0.00019) (0.00026) (0.00019) (0.00022)
HighXt 0.00074*** 0.00091*** 0.00106*** 0.00121*** -0.00019** -0.00037*** 0.00031*** 0.00047***
(0.00010) (0.00018) (0.00011) (0.00020) (0.00008) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00012)
%male 0.07756 0.20724 0.00194 0.69256**
(0.17304) (0.21601) (0.20459) (0.27112)
%black 0.50558** 0.36715 0.25186 -0.11713
(0.22369) (0.26204) (0.21665) (0.21915)
%age18-35 -0.75000*** -0.59458* -0.63548** -0.70980**
(0.28121) (0.34227) (0.28446) (0.34296)
%age36-55 -0.58514** -0.31703 -0.52633** -0.97427***
(0.25890) (0.30099) (0.23068) (0.31196)
%married -0.23657 -0.06552 -0.18605 -0.01105
(0.19183) (0.17629) (0.13025) (0.11161)
%union -0.47778 -0.78629 -0.46207 -0.23430
(0.52346) (0.63578) (0.46656) (0.29016)
%high school education 0.46294** 0.87824*** 0.69749*** -0.47278**
(0.20983) (0.25605) (0.18923) (0.19643)
%some college education -0.09640 0.20548 0.36651 -0.80562***
(0.28051) (0.28136) (0.23106) (0.30235)
%college education and higher 1.78126*** 1.73500*** 2.14787*** -0.46920
(0.32645) (0.40341) (0.29534) (0.32843)
Constant -1.35466*** -1.16261*** -1.37642*** -1.75603*** -1.25271*** -1.54813*** -1.30876*** -0.53079**
(0.01258) (0.37033) (0.01366) (0.41851) (0.01370) (0.30443) (0.01585) (0.24281)
Observations 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450
R-squared 0.83 0.86 0.69 0.72 0.90 0.92 0.82 0.84
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 -0.05854 -0.03909 -0.04505 -0.03707 -0.03957 -0.02179 0.01662 0.01136
T-stat_1 -1.78902 -1.53161 -1.27482 -1.30908 -1.17721 -0.84358 0.61996 0.52893
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 0.05005 0.02480 0.05259 0.04291 0.02200 -0.00261 -0.00485 -0.00128
T-stat_2 1.45123 0.78984 1.66358 1.39747 0.80703 -0.13679 -0.26089 -0.07596
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 2.94081 2.05230 6.27228 7.29161 3.43281 1.25496 2.12882 1.56166
Prob > F 0.03177 0.10426 0.00030 0.00007 0.01621 0.28803 0.09428 0.19641
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5A: Implied Contract Exception (All Areas) [Dep Var: LN(emp/pop) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(IC) -0.00064 0.00864* 0.00661 0.00907 0.01032* 0.01293** 0.02488*** 0.01846***
(0.00700) (0.00484) (0.00747) (0.00555) (0.00531) (0.00537) (0.00678) (0.00472)
Adopt(IC)xLow 0.01576 -0.00838 0.00367 -0.01302 -0.00554 -0.01545* -0.03079*** -0.02422***
(0.01359) (0.00673) (0.01437) (0.00880) (0.01143) (0.00915) (0.01185) (0.00725)
Adopt(IC)xHigh 0.00948 -0.00281 -0.00098 0.00279 -0.00566 -0.00993* -0.02549** -0.01792***
(0.00909) (0.00730) (0.00848) (0.00680) (0.00585) (0.00549) (0.01046) (0.00501)
Low -0.30343*** -0.18393*** -0.30611*** -0.19029*** -0.36687*** -0.18819*** -0.28723*** -0.19772***
(0.00986) (0.01080) (0.01011) (0.00988) (0.00748) (0.00920) (0.00867) (0.00876)
High 0.19396*** -0.00126 0.29330*** 0.05661*** 0.19071*** 0.09673*** 0.04296*** 0.02968***
(0.00610) (0.01211) (0.00702) (0.01059) (0.00343) (0.00709) (0.00728) (0.00421)
LowXt -0.00041*** -0.00038*** -0.00027*** -0.00025*** -0.00025*** -0.00021*** 0.00062*** 0.00051***
(0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00005)
HighXt 0.00044*** 0.00062*** 0.00020*** 0.00040*** 0.00018*** 0.00017*** 0.00011*** 0.00011***
(0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004)
%male 0.32792*** 0.29299*** 0.23004*** 0.24827***
(0.01703) (0.01842) (0.01786) (0.02057)
%black -0.11062*** -0.08480** -0.06581** -0.11911***
(0.03245) (0.03738) (0.03083) (0.03665)
%age18-35 -0.16236*** -0.17045*** -0.17128*** -0.11423***
(0.03829) (0.04758) (0.03212) (0.02042)
%age36-55 0.04421 0.02361 0.05362** 0.10371***
(0.02891) (0.03471) (0.02513) (0.02589)
%married 0.12845*** 0.13495*** 0.13334*** 0.17884***
(0.02193) (0.02235) (0.02028) (0.01169)
%union 0.29281*** 0.28504*** 0.29400*** 0.27558***
(0.04379) (0.05090) (0.04225) (0.02839)
%high school education 0.34336*** 0.33340*** 0.27876*** 0.20675***
(0.05501) (0.05737) (0.03973) (0.02262)
%some college education 0.39568*** 0.40676*** 0.35511*** 0.36491***
(0.05104) (0.05777) (0.04435) (0.03173)
%college education and higher 0.68978*** 0.69087*** 0.70434*** 0.79309***
(0.05075) (0.05221) (0.04491) (0.03077)
Constant 2.02198*** 1.40901*** 1.97817*** 1.41587*** 2.04010*** 1.46935*** 1.99188*** 1.39202***
(0.00650) (0.03410) (0.00700) (0.02900) (0.00460) (0.02991) (0.00608) (0.03647)
Observations 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450
R-squared 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.84 0.87
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 0.01512 0.00026 0.01027 -0.00395 0.00478 -0.00253 -0.00591 -0.00575
T-stat_1 1.53108 0.03778 1.04212 -0.51897 0.57228 -0.38857 -0.68793 -0.96320
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 0.00884 0.00583 0.00563 0.01186 0.00466 0.00299 -0.00061 0.00054
T-stat_2 0.86359 0.70658 0.72429 1.69253 0.57835 0.46894 -0.06445 0.08356
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 2.33647 1.45167 1.57218 1.29269 2.14438 2.42349 4.74251 9.12422
Prob > F 0.07163 0.22563 0.19380 0.27496 0.09237 0.06379 0.00262 0.00000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5B: Implied Contract Exception (All Areas) [Dep Var: LN(avg wage) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group that have valid wage information]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(PP) -0.00631 -0.01586 -0.02445 -0.03229** -0.02746 -0.03371* 0.00186 0.00829
(0.02035) (0.01449) (0.01610) (0.01338) (0.02304) (0.01746) (0.01244) (0.01268)
Adopt(PP)xLow -0.00328 0.01822 0.02241 0.03764 0.02700 0.03948 -0.03456 -0.04360
(0.06438) (0.04540) (0.05891) (0.04567) (0.06378) (0.04616) (0.03597) (0.03278)
Adopt(PP)xHigh -0.01455 -0.02902 0.02267 0.00751 0.03843** 0.01520 -0.00304 -0.01254
(0.04305) (0.04064) (0.04274) (0.03989) (0.01900) (0.01598) (0.03019) (0.02886)
Low -0.05914 0.07601 -0.15454*** -0.00863 -0.22457*** 0.12202* -0.35291*** -0.32709***
(0.04381) (0.07045) (0.04098) (0.07356) (0.04371) (0.07147) (0.03251) (0.06527)
High -0.67726*** -1.23363*** -0.48587*** -0.93663*** -0.82345*** -0.92423*** -0.40312*** -0.28810***
(0.02920) (0.10107) (0.02865) (0.12970) (0.01247) (0.05249) (0.02404) (0.03904)
LowXt -0.00103*** -0.00096*** -0.00083*** -0.00108*** -0.00143*** -0.00142*** -0.00048*** -0.00067***
(0.00027) (0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00024) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00016) (0.00020)
HighXt 0.00092*** 0.00109*** 0.00120*** 0.00138*** -0.00023*** -0.00040*** 0.00042*** 0.00059***
(0.00016) (0.00019) (0.00015) (0.00022) (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00013) (0.00014)
%male 0.11097 0.21828 0.00103 0.67289**
(0.16201) (0.20739) (0.20775) (0.26864)
%black 0.63782** 0.47451* 0.32000 -0.25701
(0.25317) (0.28111) (0.24824) (0.25620)
%age18-35 -0.76758*** -0.62261* -0.64143** -0.71441**
(0.28583) (0.35817) (0.28544) (0.34692)
%age36-55 -0.54024** -0.27883 -0.50323** -0.99223***
(0.21868) (0.28064) (0.21004) (0.31726)
%married -0.24671 -0.09649 -0.18206 -0.03093
(0.18112) (0.17349) (0.12118) (0.12002)
%union -0.60541 -0.94298 -0.55707 -0.22821
(0.48985) (0.61857) (0.43914) (0.28605)
%high school education 0.45442** 0.86930*** 0.70454*** -0.51587**
(0.21065) (0.26745) (0.18459) (0.20392)
%some college education -0.12362 0.16482 0.38391* -0.86472***
(0.28945) (0.28763) (0.22896) (0.32763)
%college education and higher 1.81018*** 1.71667*** 2.17192*** -0.55286
(0.32548) (0.40429) (0.29170) (0.34314)
Constant -1.36499*** -1.18537*** -1.39039*** -1.74105*** -1.25036*** -1.56819*** -1.34962*** -0.48591*
(0.01705) (0.32571) (0.01343) (0.39866) (0.01956) (0.29171) (0.01051) (0.26810)
Observations 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450
R-squared 0.83 0.86 0.68 0.72 0.90 0.92 0.82 0.84
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 -0.00959 0.00236 -0.00204 0.00536 -0.00047 0.00577 -0.03270 -0.03531
T-stat_1 -0.21015 0.06839 -0.04427 0.14113 -0.01096 0.18081 -1.10492 -1.31075
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 -0.02086 -0.04489 -0.00178 -0.02477 0.01097 -0.01851 -0.00118 -0.00425
T-stat_2 -0.34524 -0.89249 -0.03356 -0.53659 0.28945 -0.65670 -0.04071 -0.16413
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 0.96441 1.16216 1.78083 2.34897 4.63779 2.70958 1.05068 1.29677
Prob > F 0.40840 0.32255 0.14840 0.07045 0.00303 0.04345 0.36880 0.27358
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6A: Public Policy Exception (All Areas) [Dep Var: LN(emp/pop) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(PP) -0.00768 -0.00897 -0.00808 -0.00990* -0.00602 -0.00745 0.00192 -0.00053
(0.00704) (0.00612) (0.00775) (0.00589) (0.00829) (0.00817) (0.00669) (0.00556)
Adopt(PP)xLow 0.00617 0.00350 0.00611 0.00383 0.00235 0.00091 -0.02372* -0.01772*
(0.01257) (0.00858) (0.01429) (0.00967) (0.01376) (0.01133) (0.01296) (0.00924)
Adopt(PP)xHigh -0.00632 -0.00533 0.00047 0.00206 0.00401 0.00326 0.00425 -0.00138
(0.01297) (0.00846) (0.01472) (0.01260) (0.01236) (0.01131) (0.01888) (0.01250)
Low -0.29825*** -0.18970*** -0.30721*** -0.19921*** -0.37092*** -0.19735*** -0.29176*** -0.20146***
(0.00863) (0.01192) (0.00954) (0.01043) (0.00883) (0.01126) (0.01119) (0.01074)
High 0.20221*** -0.00026 0.29254*** 0.05766*** 0.18569*** 0.09153*** 0.02744** 0.02024**
(0.00986) (0.01132) (0.01145) (0.01088) (0.00818) (0.00948) (0.01219) (0.00789)
LowXt -0.00039*** -0.00041*** -0.00028*** -0.00030*** -0.00027*** -0.00025*** 0.00061*** 0.00050***
(0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00005)
HighXt 0.00048*** 0.00063*** 0.00020*** 0.00040*** 0.00015** 0.00014** 0.00003 0.00007
(0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00009) (0.00006)
%male 0.32715*** 0.28678*** 0.22375*** 0.24672***
(0.01713) (0.01972) (0.01950) (0.01842)
%black -0.09594*** -0.06495 -0.05263 -0.11307***
(0.03562) (0.04399) (0.03701) (0.04376)
%age18-35 -0.16297*** -0.17494*** -0.17622*** -0.11790***
(0.04129) (0.05097) (0.03447) (0.01974)
%age36-55 0.04693 0.02323 0.05149* 0.10073***
(0.03037) (0.03657) (0.02670) (0.02310)
%married 0.12932*** 0.13456*** 0.13272*** 0.17900***
(0.02282) (0.02365) (0.02100) (0.01192)
%union 0.28358*** 0.27946*** 0.29296*** 0.26719***
(0.04403) (0.05142) (0.04184) (0.02969)
%high school education 0.34283*** 0.33291*** 0.27857*** 0.21685***
(0.05648) (0.05858) (0.04056) (0.02233)
%some college education 0.39453*** 0.40539*** 0.35348*** 0.37829***
(0.05146) (0.05869) (0.04538) (0.03261)
%college education and higher 0.69130*** 0.69222*** 0.70415*** 0.80379***
(0.05117) (0.05315) (0.04594) (0.02889)
Constant 2.02469*** 1.41684*** 1.98687*** 1.43125*** 2.05068*** 1.48768*** 2.00850*** 1.39861***
(0.00456) (0.03267) (0.00528) (0.02805) (0.00564) (0.03248) (0.00373) (0.02680)
Observations 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450 21450
R-squared 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.84 0.87
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 -0.00151 -0.00547 -0.00198 -0.00607 -0.00366 -0.00654 -0.02179 -0.01825
T-stat_1 -0.16410 -0.75566 -0.19248 -0.69038 -0.41081 -0.95395 -1.47010 -1.65947
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 -0.01401 -0.01430 -0.00762 -0.00784 -0.00201 -0.00419 0.00617 -0.00191
T-stat_2 -1.01435 -1.29902 -0.55199 -0.58441 -0.19974 -0.50999 0.38727 -0.17678
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 0.72832 1.16488 0.62079 1.03736 0.32662 0.67437 1.61337 2.25321
Prob > F 0.53493 0.32148 0.60147 0.37469 0.80612 0.56764 0.18392 0.08000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6B: Public Policy Exception (All Areas) [Dep Var: LN(avg wage) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group that have valid wage information]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(IC) 0.00683 0.00020 -0.00914 -0.01088 0.01475* 0.01642 0.02583* 0.02340
(0.00652) (0.01358) (0.00726) (0.01236) (0.00846) (0.01089) (0.01491) (0.01519)
Adopt(IC)xLow -0.02014 -0.03662 -0.01547 -0.04070 -0.02311 -0.04316 -0.06739*** -0.06963***
(0.04210) (0.02970) (0.04468) (0.03353) (0.04646) (0.03554) (0.01839) (0.02216)
Adopt(IC)xHigh 0.03106 0.04439 0.06633* 0.07576*** 0.01014 0.00123 -0.00613 -0.00412
(0.05196) (0.04416) (0.03599) (0.02652) (0.03471) (0.02866) (0.02644) (0.02499)
Low -0.32219*** -0.37519*** -0.38442*** -0.40802*** -0.44367*** -0.41826*** -0.53376*** -0.52413***
(0.03110) (0.06205) (0.02823) (0.05347) (0.03254) (0.04563) (0.01997) (0.02928)
High -0.62353*** -0.86755*** -0.39131*** -0.51463*** -0.71411*** -0.71918*** -0.33836*** -0.31639***
(0.02218) (0.04570) (0.02313) (0.06692) (0.02172) (0.02775) (0.01823) (0.01688)
LowXt -0.00049** -0.00017 -0.00026 -0.00013 -0.00095*** -0.00076*** -0.00013 -0.00023
(0.00025) (0.00021) (0.00022) (0.00021) (0.00023) (0.00022) (0.00017) (0.00016)
HighXt 0.00106*** 0.00094*** 0.00128*** 0.00097*** -0.00016 -0.00037*** 0.00021 0.00016
(0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00015) (0.00015)
%male -0.18756* -0.24472* -0.18727 0.07702
(0.10906) (0.14739) (0.12198) (0.08583)
%black -0.12268 -0.17932 -0.15944 -0.03192
(0.20377) (0.21849) (0.21704) (0.10165)
%age18-35 0.35643* 0.34652*** 0.26110* 0.32944***
(0.19145) (0.13079) (0.14178) (0.05388)
%age36-55 0.29355* 0.34984*** 0.22980** 0.28085***
(0.17813) (0.11008) (0.09391) (0.06821)
%married -0.21347 -0.14663 -0.23474* -0.03092
(0.19581) (0.14678) (0.14108) (0.04894)
%union 0.39232* 0.23227 0.20408 0.04289
(0.23503) (0.26582) (0.18597) (0.14282)
%high school education -0.57929*** -0.42960** -0.46637*** -0.27431***
(0.20412) (0.19817) (0.18069) (0.08250)
%some college education -0.90842*** -0.82209*** -0.75776*** -0.32997***
(0.21111) (0.20823) (0.20460) (0.09647)
%college education and higher 0.13745 0.09582 0.21216 -0.15644
(0.20601) (0.22797) (0.18592) (0.09821)
Constant -1.16178*** -0.75730*** -1.21691*** -0.91770*** -1.06907*** -0.75046*** -1.16116*** -1.23824***
(0.00474) (0.26611) (0.00574) (0.16273) (0.00892) (0.15673) (0.00705) (0.08604)
Observations 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452
R-squared 0.89 0.90 0.83 0.85 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.94
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 -0.01331 -0.03642 -0.02461 -0.05159 -0.00836 -0.02674 -0.04156 -0.04623
T-stat_1 -0.29379 -0.94721 -0.52464 -1.33532 -0.19231 -0.74733 -3.26846 -3.72906
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 0.03789 0.04458 0.05719 0.06488 0.02490 0.01765 0.01970 0.01928
T-stat_2 0.80023 1.22245 1.83721 2.92692 0.77203 0.66824 1.51103 1.54293
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 4.10805 0.93057 5.41680 3.05470 6.48318 1.15108 9.46359 8.73200
Prob > F 0.00637 0.42491 0.00101 0.02723 0.00022 0.32693 0.00000 0.00001
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Highly Populated Area for GF contains only DE and AZ
Table 7A: Good Faith Exception (Highly Populated Areas: 1M+) [Dep Var: LN(emp/pop) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
42
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(IC) -0.01313 -0.05155*** -0.00308 -0.03801*** -0.00216 -0.03855*** -0.01004 -0.04583***
(0.00912) (0.00779) (0.00841) (0.00751) (0.00588) (0.00679) (0.00848) (0.00466)
Adopt(IC)xLow -0.02767** -0.01415* -0.03804** -0.02728** -0.02788 -0.01795 0.01292 0.00519
(0.01348) (0.00850) (0.01921) (0.01071) (0.01908) (0.01598) (0.01491) (0.00985)
Adopt(IC)xHigh 0.01110 0.01121 0.00042 0.00393 0.00204 -0.00030 0.02624 0.00707
(0.01542) (0.01174) (0.00866) (0.01211) (0.00900) (0.00688) (0.01624) (0.00744)
Low -0.29208*** -0.20771*** -0.30699*** -0.22269*** -0.37317*** -0.20821*** -0.30373*** -0.19165***
(0.01284) (0.00761) (0.01106) (0.00669) (0.00868) (0.00687) (0.01608) (0.01644)
High 0.22085*** 0.03945*** 0.31126*** 0.11110*** 0.18736*** 0.08335*** -0.00571 0.00232
(0.00905) (0.01257) (0.01029) (0.01075) (0.00665) (0.00702) (0.00987) (0.00456)
LowXt -0.00066*** -0.00061*** -0.00051*** -0.00046*** -0.00055*** -0.00047*** 0.00047*** 0.00035***
(0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00007) (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00007)
HighXt 0.00030*** 0.00045*** 0.00010* 0.00028*** 0.00007 0.00012** 0.00007 0.00011**
(0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00006) (0.00004) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00004)
%male 0.31128*** 0.25974*** 0.24185*** 0.24620***
(0.02155) (0.02170) (0.01718) (0.02731)
%black -0.11481*** -0.09655*** -0.08533*** -0.12925***
(0.02837) (0.02903) (0.02711) (0.04032)
%age18-35 -0.14871*** -0.12762*** -0.15767*** -0.10337***
(0.02440) (0.03084) (0.02747) (0.01886)
%age36-55 0.08545*** 0.07891*** 0.09616*** 0.14602***
(0.02192) (0.02802) (0.02257) (0.02507)
%married 0.12945*** 0.13276*** 0.13739*** 0.17086***
(0.01636) (0.01569) (0.01346) (0.01588)
%union 0.30859*** 0.32136*** 0.25939*** 0.20926***
(0.03541) (0.03408) (0.03502) (0.03298)
%high school education 0.27669*** 0.25936*** 0.24571*** 0.23428***
(0.03971) (0.03170) (0.02953) (0.02922)
%some college education 0.33122*** 0.32509*** 0.32912*** 0.39247***
(0.04375) (0.03680) (0.03318) (0.03435)
%college education and higher 0.57515*** 0.55242*** 0.63869*** 0.78448***
(0.03986) (0.02951) (0.02978) (0.03501)
Constant 2.27386*** 1.71605*** 2.20595*** 1.70296*** 2.29190*** 1.72683*** 2.30501*** 1.62060***
(0.00428) (0.03857) (0.00400) (0.03494) (0.00282) (0.03593) (0.00335) (0.04435)
Observations 10417 10417 10424 10424 10426 10426 10440 10440
R-squared 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.74 0.81
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 -0.04080 -0.06570 -0.04112 -0.06529 -0.03004 -0.05650 0.00288 -0.04064
T-stat_1 -3.18052 -6.89728 -2.48382 -4.94043 -1.84878 -4.43944 0.24125 -4.83350
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 -0.00203 -0.04033 -0.00266 -0.03407 -0.00011 -0.03884 0.01620 -0.03876
T-stat_2 -0.15150 -3.57496 -0.33858 -3.24841 -0.00894 -3.64595 1.08991 -4.62525
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 8.49616 25.54427 3.93849 35.38949 1.52918 30.41652 1.52259 43.67560
Prob > F 0.00001 0.00000 0.00807 0.00000 0.20468 0.00000 0.20639 0.00000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Highly Populated Area for GF contains only DE and AZ
Table 7B: Good Faith Exception (Highly Populated Areas: 1M+) [Dep Var: LN(avg wage) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group that have valid wage information]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(IC) 0.04227** 0.04358** 0.01017 0.01203 0.03802** 0.04143*** -0.02728 -0.01054
(0.02077) (0.02001) (0.01986) (0.02006) (0.01651) (0.01562) (0.02127) (0.02048)
Adopt(IC)xLow -0.15270** -0.14101** -0.13100** -0.12494** -0.14395** -0.13876** 0.03366 -0.00434
(0.06045) (0.05803) (0.06172) (0.06093) (0.06104) (0.05782) (0.07591) (0.06815)
Adopt(IC)xHigh 0.09377** 0.08189** 0.14461*** 0.14086*** 0.06761* 0.06098* 0.05132* 0.04235
(0.03759) (0.03732) (0.04517) (0.04303) (0.03803) (0.03566) (0.02738) (0.02833)
Low 0.09122*** 0.11564*** -0.00789 0.00632 -0.07724*** 0.05753 -0.28386*** -0.18515***
(0.01682) (0.04300) (0.02043) (0.03966) (0.02101) (0.03653) (0.03741) (0.05701)
High -0.74902*** -0.91654*** -0.56319*** -0.74611*** -0.88646*** -0.98726*** -0.46434*** -0.39545***
(0.01431) (0.05796) (0.01477) (0.07228) (0.01263) (0.02996) (0.01484) (0.02288)
LowXt -0.00091*** -0.00082*** -0.00066*** -0.00075*** -0.00113*** -0.00119*** -0.00055*** -0.00082***
(0.00014) (0.00018) (0.00014) (0.00020) (0.00014) (0.00019) (0.00013) (0.00015)
HighXt 0.00053*** 0.00048*** 0.00094*** 0.00098*** -0.00020** -0.00025** 0.00061*** 0.00081***
(0.00011) (0.00015) (0.00012) (0.00017) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00011)
%male 0.08934 0.36024*** 0.31004*** 0.65254***
(0.10667) (0.12965) (0.11702) (0.19893)
%black 0.15241 0.06044 -0.03234 -0.87814***
(0.18535) (0.20984) (0.19786) (0.24521)
%age18-35 -0.41615*** -0.28913** -0.47508*** -0.06425
(0.15113) (0.13380) (0.14144) (0.14099)
%age36-55 -0.17037 0.02156 -0.26839*** -0.17909
(0.11061) (0.10503) (0.10246) (0.11807)
%married 0.09079 0.13376 0.08350 0.15187*
(0.09207) (0.09079) (0.07134) (0.07963)
%union 0.40424 0.43213 0.20343 0.09870
(0.25010) (0.30379) (0.24491) (0.19502)
%high school education 0.01434 0.13797 0.14499 -0.33621***
(0.20422) (0.20617) (0.19142) (0.12556)
%some college education -0.12305 -0.06542 0.17427 -0.59544***
(0.22443) (0.22052) (0.21264) (0.21268)
%college education and higher 0.42119* 0.36999 0.74754*** -0.81745***
(0.21842) (0.24362) (0.18605) (0.22575)
Constant -1.40877*** -1.32682*** -1.42541*** -1.68676*** -1.29996*** -1.49234*** -1.35012*** -1.30766***
(0.00528) (0.17884) (0.00501) (0.13220) (0.00677) (0.11130) (0.01147) (0.11753)
Observations 17400 17400 17400 17400 17400 17400 17400 17400
R-squared 0.89 0.90 0.79 0.80 0.92 0.92 0.77 0.80
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 -0.11043 -0.09743 -0.12083 -0.11292 -0.10592 -0.09732 0.00637 -0.01488
T-stat_1 -2.59816 -2.30769 -2.51483 -2.32318 -2.29033 -2.13338 0.11164 -0.28789
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 0.13603 0.12547 0.15478 0.15289 0.10563 0.10241 0.02404 0.03181
T-stat_2 2.95819 2.87037 3.29212 3.50213 2.13129 2.25470 0.62705 0.84785
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 3.18164 3.48026 4.44688 5.87568 1.89029 2.42182 2.31792 1.07494
Prob > F 0.02288 0.01519 0.00396 0.00053 0.12881 0.06394 0.07343 0.35827
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8A: Good Faith Exception (Other Areas: <1M) [Dep Var: LN(emp/pop) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(IC) 0.00620 0.01477* 0.02368*** 0.02681*** 0.02058** 0.02208** 0.02854** 0.02697**
(0.00795) (0.00877) (0.00867) (0.00923) (0.00927) (0.01091) (0.01135) (0.01174)
Adopt(IC)xLow 0.01754 0.00607 -0.01648 -0.01882** -0.01648 -0.01357 -0.01687 -0.01501
(0.01592) (0.01002) (0.01275) (0.00952) (0.01144) (0.01005) (0.01640) (0.01214)
Adopt(IC)xHigh 0.00682 -0.00856 -0.02040 -0.02040 -0.00810 -0.01472** -0.02421** -0.02177***
(0.00944) (0.00969) (0.01585) (0.01310) (0.00712) (0.00631) (0.00989) (0.00628)
Low -0.28001*** -0.19196*** -0.28282*** -0.19892*** -0.35134*** -0.19340*** -0.29311*** -0.21786***
(0.00829) (0.00914) (0.00835) (0.00863) (0.00848) (0.00987) (0.00815) (0.00782)
High 0.17589*** 0.01011 0.27329*** 0.07840*** 0.17852*** 0.09768*** 0.05042*** 0.03189***
(0.00666) (0.01029) (0.00727) (0.01008) (0.00468) (0.00793) (0.00557) (0.00345)
LowXt -0.00027*** -0.00031*** -0.00018*** -0.00020*** -0.00008 -0.00010** 0.00050*** 0.00038***
(0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00006) (0.00006)
HighXt 0.00052*** 0.00062*** 0.00024*** 0.00039*** 0.00031*** 0.00028*** 0.00009 0.00009*
(0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005)
%male 0.30728*** 0.29249*** 0.20344*** 0.22588***
(0.01936) (0.01870) (0.02027) (0.01485)
%black -0.13649*** -0.11435*** -0.09290*** -0.05998*
(0.02955) (0.03030) (0.03107) (0.03075)
%age18-35 -0.10792*** -0.10988*** -0.11030*** -0.14028***
(0.02184) (0.01978) (0.01574) (0.01607)
%age36-55 0.06544*** 0.07612*** 0.08676*** 0.07308***
(0.01784) (0.01717) (0.01730) (0.01604)
%married 0.16800*** 0.17755*** 0.17170*** 0.16745***
(0.01397) (0.01374) (0.01350) (0.01430)
%union 0.31530*** 0.33865*** 0.32641*** 0.32243***
(0.03366) (0.03787) (0.03684) (0.02659)
%high school education 0.23544*** 0.20539*** 0.19514*** 0.18990***
(0.02760) (0.02593) (0.02371) (0.01858)
%some college education 0.32092*** 0.29932*** 0.29205*** 0.33623***
(0.02890) (0.02701) (0.02232) (0.02458)
%college education and higher 0.52218*** 0.48494*** 0.58455*** 0.74991***
(0.03024) (0.02727) (0.02962) (0.02267)
Constant 2.02348*** 1.46505*** 1.98317*** 1.46132*** 2.04129*** 1.49634*** 2.00879*** 1.46987***
(0.00371) (0.02463) (0.00320) (0.02544) (0.00283) (0.02925) (0.00338) (0.02072)
Observations 17382 17382 17383 17383 17380 17380 17384 17384
R-squared 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.87 0.89 0.74 0.79
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 0.02373 0.02084 0.00721 0.00799 0.00410 0.00852 0.01167 0.01196
T-stat_1 1.61293 1.54814 0.64278 0.82305 0.38968 0.79812 0.86811 0.96087
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 0.01301 0.00621 0.00328 0.00641 0.01248 0.00736 0.00433 0.00520
T-stat_2 0.98288 0.44648 0.24280 0.49835 1.54540 0.78623 0.51583 0.56014
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 1.31935 1.40074 2.51290 3.09746 1.69527 2.25702 2.93683 4.03617
Prob > F 0.26607 0.24048 0.05661 0.02567 0.16566 0.07960 0.03195 0.00703
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8B: Good Faith Exception (Other Areas: <1M) [Dep Var: LN(avg wage) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group that have valid wage information]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(IC) -0.02600* -0.02272 -0.04908*** -0.04875*** -0.01622 -0.01285 -0.02186 -0.02167
(0.01471) (0.01423) (0.01667) (0.01566) (0.01605) (0.01601) (0.02150) (0.02116)
Adopt(IC)xLow -0.05365* -0.05590** -0.01931 -0.01663 -0.04838 -0.04527 -0.02580 -0.02628
(0.03043) (0.02560) (0.03095) (0.02936) (0.03522) (0.03156) (0.03422) (0.03326)
Adopt(IC)xHigh 0.06605** 0.06416*** 0.09820*** 0.10116*** 0.02511 0.02143 0.00526 0.00429
(0.02911) (0.02353) (0.03065) (0.02656) (0.02781) (0.02366) (0.02898) (0.02732)
Low -0.29176*** -0.34941*** -0.37495*** -0.40966*** -0.41714*** -0.39985*** -0.53192*** -0.53165***
(0.02726) (0.05201) (0.02531) (0.05070) (0.02860) (0.04063) (0.02852) (0.03806)
High -0.65958*** -0.88408*** -0.43993*** -0.56448*** -0.72795*** -0.73942*** -0.34310*** -0.32498***
(0.02956) (0.03935) (0.03186) (0.06870) (0.02047) (0.02441) (0.02893) (0.02871)
LowXt -0.00041* -0.00011 -0.00024 -0.00015 -0.00088*** -0.00074*** -0.00010 -0.00017
(0.00024) (0.00020) (0.00023) (0.00022) (0.00023) (0.00022) (0.00018) (0.00019)
HighXt 0.00095*** 0.00084*** 0.00113*** 0.00083*** -0.00020 -0.00040*** 0.00019 0.00015
(0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00013) (0.00012) (0.00014) (0.00015)
%male -0.16229 -0.17725 -0.13714 0.03291
(0.10572) (0.13183) (0.10807) (0.10008)
%black -0.06578 -0.00244 -0.12379 0.03366
(0.22404) (0.24877) (0.22355) (0.09972)
%age18-35 0.38897** 0.30636** 0.25865** 0.32875***
(0.19035) (0.13407) (0.12361) (0.05218)
%age36-55 0.32343** 0.30017*** 0.21427*** 0.26794***
(0.15170) (0.09283) (0.07783) (0.07161)
%married -0.23546 -0.17395 -0.25410** -0.04865
(0.14686) (0.11143) (0.11463) (0.05539)
%union 0.58079** 0.40461* 0.28554 0.03303
(0.22782) (0.23611) (0.18790) (0.12665)
%high school education -0.52086*** -0.31832* -0.41555*** -0.25342***
(0.16405) (0.16474) (0.16092) (0.07965)
%some college education -0.82363*** -0.71611*** -0.69576*** -0.30200***
(0.17992) (0.18909) (0.17790) (0.10438)
%college education and higher 0.14301 0.17913 0.23251 -0.07889
(0.17508) (0.20816) (0.16517) (0.07646)
Constant -1.14829*** -0.82390*** -1.18852*** -0.96193*** -1.06085*** -0.78840*** -1.14626*** -1.21616***
(0.00938) (0.21873) (0.01277) (0.14106) (0.00937) (0.13188) (0.01679) (0.10176)
Observations 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452 10452
R-squared 0.89 0.90 0.84 0.85 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.93
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 -0.07966 -0.07862 -0.06839 -0.06538 -0.06460 -0.05812 -0.04766 -0.04795
T-stat_1 -2.80743 -3.23943 -2.42314 -2.40338 -2.31416 -2.34897 -2.13502 -2.20531
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 0.04005 0.04145 0.04911 0.05241 0.00888 0.00858 -0.01660 -0.01738
T-stat_2 1.27160 1.64395 1.72267 1.98999 0.30066 0.33623 -0.87828 -0.98518
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 3.36663 4.20701 4.85650 6.28589 2.62151 2.31756 2.33607 2.39355
Prob > F 0.01777 0.00555 0.00223 0.00029 0.04895 0.07349 0.07170 0.06642
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 9A: Implied Contract Exception (Highly Populated Areas: 1M+) [Dep Var: LN(emp/pop) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(IC) -0.01091 -0.00512 -0.00629 -0.00702 0.00041 0.00071 0.00785 0.00979
(0.00986) (0.00702) (0.00993) (0.00657) (0.00739) (0.00650) (0.01081) (0.00715)
Adopt(IC)xLow 0.00236 -0.00894 -0.01224 -0.01648* -0.01866 -0.01883* -0.02172 -0.02235**
(0.01787) (0.00974) (0.01750) (0.00935) (0.01350) (0.01087) (0.01835) (0.00964)
Adopt(IC)xHigh 0.01090 -0.00466 0.00629 0.00828 -0.00583 -0.01150* -0.01113 -0.01771**
(0.01019) (0.00783) (0.00893) (0.00802) (0.00793) (0.00647) (0.01473) (0.00744)
Low -0.30002*** -0.20479*** -0.30770*** -0.21807*** -0.36743*** -0.19883*** -0.28650*** -0.17559***
(0.01442) (0.00962) (0.01435) (0.00807) (0.01067) (0.00980) (0.01269) (0.01357)
High 0.21635*** 0.04396*** 0.30733*** 0.10443*** 0.19167*** 0.08963*** 0.00785 0.01591***
(0.00771) (0.01213) (0.00789) (0.00931) (0.00458) (0.00676) (0.00793) (0.00602)
LowXt -0.00066*** -0.00059*** -0.00049*** -0.00043*** -0.00052*** -0.00045*** 0.00051*** 0.00038***
(0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00007) (0.00009) (0.00008) (0.00010) (0.00008)
HighXt 0.00028*** 0.00046*** 0.00009 0.00027*** 0.00008 0.00014*** 0.00009* 0.00014***
(0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00004)
%male 0.31555*** 0.26755*** 0.24678*** 0.24899***
(0.02308) (0.02158) (0.01736) (0.02884)
%black -0.09814*** -0.07532** -0.07445** -0.13495***
(0.03469) (0.03644) (0.03458) (0.03636)
%age18-35 -0.15972*** -0.13550*** -0.15950*** -0.10534***
(0.03166) (0.03825) (0.02806) (0.01851)
%age36-55 0.07839*** 0.07213** 0.09453*** 0.14368***
(0.02492) (0.03011) (0.02351) (0.02340)
%married 0.12464*** 0.12580*** 0.13389*** 0.17116***
(0.01730) (0.01637) (0.01574) (0.01502)
%union 0.32028*** 0.33807*** 0.26928*** 0.21827***
(0.03528) (0.03503) (0.03645) (0.03087)
%high school education 0.28977*** 0.27428*** 0.25567*** 0.22892***
(0.04031) (0.03920) (0.02994) (0.02835)
%some college education 0.34371*** 0.34521*** 0.34179*** 0.38787***
(0.04085) (0.04229) (0.03594) (0.03354)
%college education and higher 0.58827*** 0.56924*** 0.64918*** 0.77993***
(0.03364) (0.03157) (0.02978) (0.03579)
Constant 2.28171*** 1.71451*** 2.21127*** 1.69829*** 2.29163*** 1.71611*** 2.29586*** 1.61557***
(0.00673) (0.03802) (0.00699) (0.03255) (0.00442) (0.03211) (0.00665) (0.04368)
Observations 10417 10417 10424 10424 10426 10426 10440 10440
R-squared 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.74 0.81
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 -0.00855 -0.01406 -0.01853 -0.02350 -0.01825 -0.01812 -0.01388 -0.01256
T-stat_1 -0.53555 -1.13882 -1.34270 -2.07658 -1.51762 -1.73918 -0.94564 -1.30717
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 -0.00000 -0.00978 0.00001 0.00127 -0.00543 -0.01079 -0.00329 -0.00791
T-stat_2 -0.00024 -0.98811 0.00083 0.15178 -0.51599 -1.24149 -0.22071 -0.82024
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 0.62090 0.82768 0.79131 1.48232 1.31613 2.24634 0.69406 3.84754
Prob > F 0.60141 0.47840 0.49854 0.21714 0.26715 0.08077 0.55555 0.00915
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 9B: Implied Contract Exception (Highly Populated Areas: 1M+) [Dep Var: LN(avg wage) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group that have valid wage information]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(IC) -0.01434 -0.01809 -0.03183** -0.03505*** -0.02057 -0.01811 -0.06603*** -0.05230**
(0.01283) (0.01161) (0.01268) (0.01164) (0.01557) (0.01532) (0.02194) (0.02265)
Adopt(IC)xLow -0.00897 0.00143 0.02190 0.02212 0.01615 0.00984 0.13565*** 0.09420**
(0.03461) (0.02976) (0.03847) (0.03280) (0.04181) (0.03714) (0.04592) (0.04251)
Adopt(IC)xHigh 0.02521 0.00776 0.04168 0.03195 0.00096 -0.00855 0.03268 0.03520
(0.03087) (0.02803) (0.03177) (0.03123) (0.02663) (0.02287) (0.02724) (0.03139)
Low 0.07899*** 0.09245* -0.03118 -0.01990 -0.10005*** 0.04899 -0.34228*** -0.23113***
(0.02332) (0.05073) (0.02898) (0.05209) (0.02969) (0.03967) (0.03743) (0.05888)
High -0.74710*** -0.89302*** -0.56225*** -0.70989*** -0.87798*** -0.97511*** -0.47262*** -0.41034***
(0.02027) (0.06241) (0.01811) (0.08543) (0.01595) (0.03260) (0.02016) (0.02641)
LowXt -0.00093*** -0.00087*** -0.00078*** -0.00087*** -0.00123*** -0.00127*** -0.00100*** -0.00113***
(0.00016) (0.00021) (0.00017) (0.00026) (0.00018) (0.00025) (0.00022) (0.00022)
HighXt 0.00046*** 0.00041** 0.00084*** 0.00088*** -0.00018 -0.00019 0.00051*** 0.00069***
(0.00015) (0.00020) (0.00015) (0.00021) (0.00013) (0.00015) (0.00013) (0.00015)
%male 0.09287 0.34869** 0.32165** 0.65232***
(0.11587) (0.14166) (0.12962) (0.19254)
%black 0.30651** 0.24593 0.16035 -0.63874***
(0.13784) (0.16607) (0.13779) (0.22626)
%age18-35 -0.52762*** -0.38825*** -0.57731*** -0.08745
(0.15322) (0.12689) (0.13404) (0.13451)
%age36-55 -0.14578 0.08059 -0.24929*** -0.17384
(0.10157) (0.11037) (0.09067) (0.10821)
%married 0.10449 0.16362 0.05794 0.15717*
(0.10026) (0.10630) (0.06926) (0.08051)
%union 0.51847* 0.55351 0.29360 0.12608
(0.31250) (0.38153) (0.31536) (0.17938)
%high school education 0.04449 0.20864 0.22311 -0.28625***
(0.22297) (0.21740) (0.17833) (0.10197)
%some college education -0.19059 -0.07272 0.20416 -0.52304***
(0.23779) (0.21108) (0.16718) (0.15358)
%college education and higher 0.39701* 0.30609 0.84674*** -0.74247***
(0.23541) (0.29921) (0.15900) (0.18193)
Constant -1.38905*** -1.27572*** -1.39806*** -1.67853*** -1.27594*** -1.49213*** -1.30105*** -1.31433***
(0.01127) (0.23536) (0.01234) (0.15527) (0.01388) (0.12909) (0.01957) (0.10079)
Observations 17400 17400 17400 17400 17400 17400 17400 17400
R-squared 0.88 0.89 0.77 0.78 0.91 0.92 0.78 0.81
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 -0.02331 -0.01666 -0.00994 -0.01293 -0.00442 -0.00827 0.06961 0.04190
T-stat_1 -0.90611 -0.71988 -0.33012 -0.47628 -0.15182 -0.32744 2.48919 1.65705
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 0.01086 -0.01033 0.00985 -0.00310 -0.01961 -0.02666 -0.03335 -0.01710
T-stat_2 0.27538 -0.29530 0.25052 -0.08539 -0.53467 -0.88067 -1.85595 -0.79199
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 1.60697 1.52825 4.86647 4.33754 1.45733 1.50288 3.89664 2.02207
Prob > F 0.18543 0.20489 0.00220 0.00462 0.22404 0.21156 0.00854 0.10848
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 10A: Implied Contract Exception (Other Areas: <1M) [Dep Var: LN(emp/pop) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adopt(IC) -0.00356 0.00860 0.00307 0.00828 0.00589 0.00996 0.02336*** 0.01665**
(0.00902) (0.00598) (0.00869) (0.00728) (0.00661) (0.00648) (0.00887) (0.00651)
Adopt(IC)xLow 0.02525 -0.00445 0.01815 -0.00476 0.00313 -0.01114 -0.03365** -0.02599***
(0.01720) (0.00793) (0.01488) (0.00956) (0.01143) (0.00870) (0.01467) (0.00841)
Adopt(IC)xHigh -0.00155 -0.01308* -0.00928 -0.00728 -0.00998 -0.01037** -0.02767*** -0.01858***
(0.00850) (0.00761) (0.01097) (0.00931) (0.00659) (0.00477) (0.00859) (0.00493)
Low -0.28927*** -0.18941*** -0.29265*** -0.19850*** -0.35453*** -0.18961*** -0.28001*** -0.20835***
(0.01133) (0.00957) (0.01056) (0.00983) (0.00888) (0.01037) (0.01173) (0.00918)
High 0.17750*** 0.01403 0.27503*** 0.07790*** 0.18206*** 0.09940*** 0.05977*** 0.03809***
(0.00749) (0.01086) (0.00831) (0.01104) (0.00450) (0.00750) (0.00709) (0.00409)
LowXt -0.00035*** -0.00029*** -0.00024*** -0.00019*** -0.00010* -0.00007 0.00061*** 0.00047***
(0.00007) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00008) (0.00006)
HighXt 0.00053*** 0.00067*** 0.00026*** 0.00041*** 0.00034*** 0.00032*** 0.00018*** 0.00015***
(0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00005)
%male 0.30841*** 0.29272*** 0.20828*** 0.22353***
(0.01889) (0.01788) (0.01939) (0.01468)
%black -0.14059*** -0.11146*** -0.09700*** -0.07642***
(0.02572) (0.02595) (0.02487) (0.02780)
%age18-35 -0.10606*** -0.11068*** -0.10988*** -0.13906***
(0.02205) (0.01971) (0.01545) (0.01581)
%age36-55 0.06548*** 0.07525*** 0.08673*** 0.07453***
(0.01815) (0.01761) (0.01740) (0.01623)
%married 0.16682*** 0.17622*** 0.17097*** 0.16720***
(0.01422) (0.01404) (0.01362) (0.01401)
%union 0.31564*** 0.33810*** 0.32566*** 0.31231***
(0.03413) (0.03900) (0.03863) (0.02470)
%high school education 0.23424*** 0.20749*** 0.19780*** 0.18375***
(0.02847) (0.02631) (0.02400) (0.01717)
%some college education 0.32154*** 0.30161*** 0.29399*** 0.32953***
(0.03053) (0.02832) (0.02256) (0.02221)
%college education and higher 0.52341*** 0.49007*** 0.58631*** 0.74448***
(0.03111) (0.02804) (0.02975) (0.02137)
Constant 2.02274*** 1.45744*** 1.98010*** 1.45498*** 2.03662*** 1.48549*** 1.99233*** 1.46503***
(0.00849) (0.02549) (0.00817) (0.02543) (0.00653) (0.02977) (0.00843) (0.02097)
Observations 17382 17382 17383 17383 17380 17380 17384 17384
R-squared 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.87 0.89 0.74 0.79
T test: Adopt+AdoptxLow=0 0.02169 0.00414 0.02122 0.00353 0.00902 -0.00118 -0.01030 -0.00934
T-stat_1 2.01155 0.64493 2.16342 0.55135 1.06835 -0.18921 -1.05363 -1.30266
test: Adopt+AdoptxHigh=0 -0.00511 -0.00448 -0.00620 0.00101 -0.00409 -0.00041 -0.00431 -0.00193
T-stat_2 -0.36741 -0.41202 -0.50660 0.10861 -0.35601 -0.05290 -0.57759 -0.33505
F test: Adopt=AdoptxLow=AdoptxHigh=0 1.53402 2.31325 1.92019 0.55468 2.03687 2.18362 3.83718 5.10548
Prob > F 0.20341 0.07388 0.12390 0.64496 0.10639 0.08772 0.00927 0.00157
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 10B: Implied Contract Exception (Other Areas: <1M) [Dep Var: LN(avg wage) by occupation group Low, Medium, High]
Weighted Least Square [Weight = (sqrt of) # of obs that belong to each occupation group that have valid wage information]
Controls are at the occupation group level; Standard errors are clustered by state
Any Training School Training Formal Training Informal Training
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